confessions and enchiridion [227]
quotation is Dido's lament over Aeneas' prospective abandonment of her. She is saying that if she could have foreseen such a disaster, she would have been able to bear it. Augustine's criticism here is a literalistic quibble. [16] Heb. 11:1. [17] Sacra eloquia -- a favorite phrase of Augustine's for the Bible. [18] Rom. 8:24, 25 (Old Latin). [19] James 2:19. [20] One of the standard titles of early Greek philosophical treatises would translate into Latin as De rerum natura. This is, in fact, the title of Lucretius' famous poem, the greatest philosophical work written in classical Latin. [21] This basic motif appears everywhere in Augustine's thought as the very foundation of his whole system. [22] This section (Chs. III and IV) is the most explicit statement of a major motif which pervades the whole of Augustinian metaphysics. We see it in his earliest writings, Soliloquies, 1, 2, and De ordine, II, 7. It is obviously a part of the Neoplatonic heritage which Augustine appropriated for his Christian philosophy. The good is positive, constructive, essential; evil is privative, destructive, parasitic on the good. It has its origin, not in nature, but in the will. Cf. Confessions, Bk. VII, Chs. III, V, XII-XVI; On Continence, 14-16; On the Gospel of John, Tractate XCVIII, 7; City of God, XI, 17; XII, 7-9. [23] Isa. 5:20. [24] Matt. 12:35. [25] This refers to Aristotle's well-known principle of "the excluded middle." [26] Matt. 7:18. [27] Cf. Matt. 12:33. [28] Virgil, Georgios, II, 490. [29] Ibid., 479. [30] Sed in via pedum, non in via morum. [31] Virgil, Eclogue, VIII, 42. The context of the passage is Damon's complaint over his faithless Nyssa; he is here remembering the first time he ever saw her -- when he was twelve! Cf. Theocritus, II, 82. [32] Cf. Matt. 5:37. [33] Cf. Confessions, Bk. X, Ch. XXIII. [34] Ad consentium contra mendacium, CSEL (J. Zycha, ed.), Vol. 41, pp. 469-528; also Migne, PL, 40, c. 517-548; English translation by H.B. Jaffee in Deferrari, St. Augustine: Treatises on Various Subjects (The Fathers of the Church, New York, 1952), pp. 113-179. This had been written about a year earlier than the Enchiridion. Augustine had also written another treatise On Lying much earlier, c. 395; see De mendacio in CSEL (J. Zycha, ed.), Vol. 41, pp. 413-466; Migne, PL, 40, c. 487-518; English translation by M.S. Muldowney in Deferrari, op. cit., pp. 47-109. This summary of his position here represents no change of view whatever on this question. [35] Sallust, The War with Catiline, X, 6-7. [36] Cf. Acts 12:9. [37] Virgil, Aeneid, X, 392. [38] This refers to one of the first of the Cassiciacum dialogues, Contra Academicos. The gist of Augustine's refutation of skepticism is in III, 23ff. Throughout his whole career he continued to maintain this position: that certain knowledge begins with self-knowledge. Cf. Confessions, Bk. V, Ch. X, 19; see also City of God, XI, xxvii. [39] Hab. 2:4; Rom. 1:17. [40] A direct contrast between suspensus assenso -- the watchword of the Academics -- and assensio, the badge of Christian certitude. [41] See above, VII, 90. [42] Matt. 5:37. [43] Matt. 6:12. [44] Rom. 5:12. [45] Cf. Luke 20:36. [46] Rom. 4:17. [47] Wis. 11:20. [48] 2 Peter 2:19. [49] John 8:36. [50] Eph. 2:8. [51] 1 Cor. 7:25. [52] Eph. 2:8, 9. [53] Eph. 2:10. [54] Cf. Gal. 6:15; I1 Cor. 5:17. [55] Ps. 51:10. [56] Phil. 2:13. [57] Rom. 9:16. [58] Prov. 8:35 (LXX). [59] From the days at Cassiciacum till the very end, Augustine toiled with the mystery of the primacy of God's grace and the reality of human freedom. Of two things he was unwaveringly sure, even though they involved him in a paradox and the appearance of confusion. The first is that God's grace is not only primary but also sufficient as the ground and source of human willing. And against the Pelagians and other detractors from grace, he did not hesitate to insist that grace is irresistible and inviolable. Cf. On Grace and Free Will, 99, 41-43; On the Predestination of the Saints, 19:10; On the Gift