Death Valley_ The Summer Offensive, I Corps, August 1969 - Keith Nolan [115]
The next afternoon, Colonel Codispoti helicoptered into the 2/7 Command Post. Lugger had assumed command of his battalion on 28 April, Codispoti his regiment on 9 July, and in the following weeks their relationship had deteriorated. It was almost inevitable. Codispoti was a New York City Italian. Lugger was a short, slightly built man, very intelligent, but also sensitive and pensive. His parents were both Jewish immigrants from eastern Europe. He had originally been impressed by Codispoti’s dynamic and down-to-earth style, but he became increasingly infuriated by his loudly overbearing manner. Codispoti was something of a legend as “a crazy son of a bitch,” a phrase both his admirers and detractors used with different inflections. Lugger thought him a tyrant whose decisions were ruled by emotionalism—if he didn’t like you, you could do nothing right. The colonel’s dislike of Lugger seemed to affect his attitude towards the entire battalion; while Codispoti was seen by 1/7 as a positive leader, at the grunt level in 2/7 he was a remote hard-ass who didn’t care about them.
Codispoti thought Lugger indecisive, thus ineffective.
Their uneasy alliance contributed to what occurred during the battle and to Codispoti’s eventual decision to relieve Lugger. Lugger, defending himself against what he considered to be an undeserved attack, noted in his watered-down rebuttal:
… he was hostile, impatient, and provocative without cause. On two occasions, at my request, we had confidential and honest conversations at which I addressed the question of his attitude toward me, and his evaluation of my performance. At the end of these meetings I had the feeling that there was a better understanding between senior and subordinate. My feelings of confidence were reinforced when on 21 August he gave me his authority to conduct such operations as I deemed appropriate in support of the adjacent Army unit. I felt I had rewarded his confidence when on 23 August he visited my CP in the field. At that time he was filled with praise for my Battalion. I remember with vividness him saying, “You’re doing a wonderful job! The Army is delighted over the way you’ve moved so swiftly. You’ve taken a lot of pressure off of them.”
Just prior to Codispoti’s visit, Lugger had been radioed by Colonel Tackaberry, CO, 196th Brigade; he wanted 2/7 to push west. Since this was contrary to his previous blocking mission, Lugger waited until Codispoti’s arrival to confirm it. Lugger was to advance the next morning but, in the meantime, G Company was to continue reconning the flanks to gauge the extent of the NVA infiltration.
1stLt Jack Larrison—a stocky, hard-drinking, level-headed young man—had taken command of Golf Company on LZ Ross the day of the move into Hiep Duc. Lugger liked him and, when Golf’s captain rotated that day, Lugger moved Larrison in from his slot as the S-5 civil affairs officer. On his third day in command, 23 August, Larrison was directed to recon a thickly vegetated knoll near the base of Hill 381.
2dLt John Pickett, Golf Two, was given the job.
Pickett moved up one side with Sgt William Adams’s squad. The platoon sergeant, SSgt Alfred Clements, went up another way with Cpl Randall Black’s squad. It was windless and blisteringly hot under helmets and flak jackets; the elephant grass was above their heads at times and it was slow going, the razored edges cutting hands and arms, sweat stinging in the slices and pouring down faces. It was impossible to see more than a few yards into the tangle.
Then the NVA hit them.
There was little to do but squeeze down into the grass as RPDs and AK47s jackhammered from some invisible spider holes.
Lieutenant Pickett radioed Staff Sergeant Clements to bring his squad across, and they got moving with Corporal Black on point. They pushed uphill through the thick brush, then shouldered their way into a small clearing near the crest. Another NVA opened fire.