Dialogues of Plato - MobileReference [334]
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place move in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in relation to the same, and according to one proportion and order, and are like the motion of a globe, we invented a fair image, which does no discredit to our ingenuity.
CLEINIAS: It does us great credit.
ATHENIAN: And the motion of the other sort which is not after the same manner, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the same, nor in one place, nor in order, nor according to any rule or proportion, may be said to be akin to senselessness and folly?
CLEINIAS: That is most true.
ATHENIAN: Then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in distinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round, either the best soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and arrange the revolution of the heaven.
CLEINIAS: And judging from what has been said, Stranger, there would be impiety in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries round the heavens.
ATHENIAN: You have understood my meaning right well, Cleinias, and now let me ask you another question.
CLEINIAS: What are you going to ask?
ATHENIAN: If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other stars, does she not carry round each individual of them?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will apply to all.
CLEINIAS: Which will you take?
ATHENIAN: Every one sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul, nor the soul of any other body living or dead; and yet there is great reason to believe that this nature, unperceived by any of our senses, is circumfused around them all, but is perceived by mind; and therefore by mind and reflection only let us apprehend the following point.
CLEINIAS: What is that?
ATHENIAN: If the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong in supposing one of three alternatives.
CLEINIAS: What are they?
ATHENIAN: Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, resides within the circular and visible body, like the soul which carries us about every way; or the soul provides herself with an external body of fire or air, as some affirm, and violently propels body by body; or thirdly, she is without such a body, but guides the sun by some extraordinary and wonderful power.
CLEINIAS: Yes, certainly; the soul can only order all things in one of these three ways.
ATHENIAN: And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the sun, whether taking the sun about in a chariot to give light to men, or acting from without, or in whatever way, ought by every man to be deemed a God.
CLEINIAS: Yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense.
ATHENIAN: And of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and months and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them, those souls are Gods, whether they are living beings and reside in bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the place and mode of their existence--and will any one who admits all this venture to deny that all things are full of Gods?
CLEINIAS: No one, Stranger, would be such a madman.
ATHENIAN: And now, Megillus and Cleinias, let us offer terms to him who has hitherto denied the existence of the Gods, and leave him.
CLEINIAS: What terms?
ATHENIAN: Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, if he be not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods. Let us see, then, whether we have said enough or not enough to those who deny that there are Gods.
CLEINIAS: Certainly, quite enough, Stranger.
ATHENIAN: Then to them we will say