Dialogues of Plato - MobileReference [371]
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? Can we say?
CLEINIAS: I am not quite certain, Stranger; but I have a suspicion that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night.
ATHENIAN: You understand me perfectly, Cleinias; and we must assume, as the argument implies, that this council possesses all virtue; and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look steadily at one thing, and on this to fix all our aims.
CLEINIAS: Quite true.
ATHENIAN: Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray--the reason is that their legislators have such different aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom; and some legislate with a view to two things at once--they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things look.
CLEINIAS: Then, Stranger, our former assertion will hold; for we were saying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.
ATHENIAN: Yes.
CLEINIAS: And we said that virtue was of four kinds?
ATHENIAN: Quite true.
CLEINIAS: And that mind was the leader of the four, and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?
ATHENIAN: You follow me capitally, Cleinias, and I would ask you to follow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of the pilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that one thing to which they ought to look; and now we may turn to mind political, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question: O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declare yourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of things which I have given you?
CLEINIAS: We cannot, Stranger.
ATHENIAN: Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where it is to be found?
CLEINIAS: For example, where?
ATHENIAN: For example, we were saying that there are four kinds of virtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And further, all four of them we call one; for we say that courage is virtue, and that prudence is virtue, and the same of the two others, as if they were in reality not many but one, that is, virtue.
CLEINIAS: Quite so.
ATHENIAN: There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. But there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue.
CLEINIAS: How do you mean?
ATHENIAN: I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let us distribute the subject into questions and answers.
CLEINIAS: Once more, what do you mean?
ATHENIAN: Ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom. I will tell you how that occurs: One of them has to do with fear; in this the beasts also participate, and quite young children--I