Dialogues of Plato - MobileReference [888]
STRANGER: And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: And other products of human creation are also twofold and go in pairs; there is the thing, with which the art of making the thing is concerned, and the image, with which imitation is concerned.
THEAETETUS: Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge that there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the lateral division there is both a divine and a human production; in the vertical there are realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes.
STRANGER: And let us not forget that of the imitative class the one part was to have been likeness-making, and the other phantastic, if it could be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real being.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: Then, now, let us again divide the phantastic art.
THEAETETUS: Where shall we make the division?
STRANGER: There is one kind which is produced by an instrument, and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the instrument.
THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
STRANGER: When any one makes himself appear like another in his figure or his voice, imitation is the name for this part of the phantastic art.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the province assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and will give that up, leaving to some one else the duty of making the class and giving it a suitable name.
THEAETETUS: Let us do as you say--assign a sphere to the one and leave the other.
STRANGER: There is a further distinction, Theaetetus, which is worthy of our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you.
THEAETETUS: Let me hear.
STRANGER: There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?
THEAETETUS: There can be no greater.
STRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure?
THEAETETUS: Naturally.
STRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that is very common.
STRANGER: And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not? Or is not the very opposite true?
THEAETETUS: The very opposite.
STRANGER: Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator--to be distinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows?
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into species; wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the sake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance--that which coexists with science, a scientific or learned imitation.
THEAETETUS: Granted.
STRANGER: The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge.
THEAETETUS: Very true.
STRANGER: Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, and see whether he is sound, like a piece of iron, or whether there is still some crack in him.
THEAETETUS: Let us examine him.
STRANGER: Indeed there is a very considerable