Divide and conquer - Tom Clancy [16]
Perhaps the president was trying to force the issue, the way John F.
Kennedy did when he announced, publicly, that he wanted Congress to give NASA the funds to put a man on the moon. But United States involvement in international intelligence-gathering was an extremely sensitive area.
A president would be reckless to attempt a wide-ranging operation like this without assurances from his own team that it was possible.
It could all be the result of a series of misunderstandings.
Maybe the president thought he had the support of the intelligence community. Confusion was certainly not uncommon in government. The question was what to do now that the idea had been presented to the world body.
The United States intelligence community was sure to be torn. Some experts would welcome the opportunity to plug directly into resources in nations like China, Colombia, and several former Soviet republics where they currently had very restricted access. Others-Hood included-would be afraid of joining forces with other nations and being fed false data, data that would then become part of U.S. intelligence gospel with potentially disastrous results. Herbert once told him about a situation in 1978, just before the overthrow of the shah of Iran, when anti extremist forces provided the CIA with a code used by supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeini to communicate via telefax. The code was accurate-then.
Once the ayatollah assumed power, the shah's files were raided, and the code was found to be in American hands.
The code remained in the CiA's system and was used to interpret secret communiques. It wasn't until the ayatollah's death in 1989-when the secret communiques said he was recovering-that the CIA went back and took a close look at the code and the disinformation they'd received.
Ten years of data had to be reviewed and much of it purged.
Hood could just imagine what Teheran would say about joining this new antiterrorism network.
"Sure, sign us up. And don't forget to use this new code to monitor the Sunni terrorists working out of Azerbaijan." It could be a real code for real transmissions, or the Iranians could use false transmissions to create deeper mistrust of the Sunnis. The United States could not refuse to help them, because the president had offered; we could not trust the code; and yet what if it turned out to be real and we ignored it?
The whole thing was a potential for disaster. For his part. Hood intended to contact Burton Gable, the president's chief of staff, to find out what he knew about the situation. Hood didn't know Gable well, but he had been one of Lawrence's think tank geniuses and was instrumental in getting the president reelected. Gable hadn't been at the dinner, but there was no policy undertaking in which he was not involved.
Hood went back to the motel, napped, then was back at Op-Center at five-thirty. He wanted to be there when his staff arrived.
Hood had spoken to psychologist Liz Gordon about Harleigh, and to attorney Lowell Coffey about the divorce, so both of them knew he was coming back. Hood had also informed General Rodgers, who had let intelligence chief Bob Herbert know.
Herbert rolled in first. He had lost his wife and the use of his legs in the American embassy bombing in Beirut in 1983. But he had turned that setback into an advantage: Herbert's customized wheelchair was a mini communications center with phone, fax, and even a satellite uplink that helped to make him one of the most effective intelligence collectors and analysts in the world.
Rodgers followed him in. Though the gray-haired officer had played a key role in ending the terrorist standoff at the United Nations, he was still recovering emotionally from the torture he'd suffered at the hands of Kurdish terrorists in the Middle East. Since his return, there hadn't been quite the same fire in his eyes or bounce in his walk.
Though he hadn't broken, some proud, vital part of him had died