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By Root 1095 0

have commanding leads in LCD screen technologies, as well as in numerous niche fields in precision machinery. So secure are Japanese monopolies in certain specialist components that hardly a computer or advanced industrial device can be built without them. Steel firms and shipbuilders boast some of the world's most efficient factories. Car manufacturers, though greatly weakened, are still a towering presence in world markets. It's a story of strengths inherited from the industries of the 1970s balanced against severe weaknesses in the industries of the new millennium. Technology in Japan is good, but not nearly as good as was once thought; it's «neither here nor there» – that is, Chuto Hanpa. Because of this mix of qualities, Japan will not crash. There is more than enough industrial power to support the population at roughly present standards. On the other hand, given its deep systemic weakness in finance and technology, Japan is not going to boom. The long-term prognosis is for more Chuto Hanpa, with GNP growth slow, unemployment edging upward, and the debt burden mounting year by year.

Part of the undertow against change is Japan's dream of becoming the leader of Southeast Asia. The old desire for empire, previously called «the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,» never completely faded, and in recent years it is enjoying new life. Japan is pouring huge amounts of industrial capital, ODA funds, monetary loans, and cultural grants into Southeast Asian nations in the hope of integrating Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other nations into a new Asian bloc, with Japan at the helm. The dream is that Southeast Asia will join hands with Japan and act as a new engine for industrial growth; Japan will then take center stage once again, and all the old policies will be vindicated. Typical of the group of theorists beating the drum for a new co-prosperity sphere is Professor Shiraishi Takashi of Kyoto University's Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, who argues that Southeast Asia at the dawn of the new century must now «choose» between the United States and Japan for its model and controlling partner. The choice, of course, should be Japan. Shiraishi represents a strong body of academic and official opinion that is angry at foreign criticism of Japan, especially what Shiraishi calls «stereotypical Anglo-American triumphalist statements that both the Japanese model and developmental authoritarianism are now bankrupt.» He longs for the old days when Japan produced an economic miracle without having to update or rationalize its internal systems. «Free-market ideas of legal contracts, impartial regulations, and transparency are all fine, and perhaps these are all portfolio investors need,» he says with some bitterness. «But can we rely safely on markets for long-term investment for industrialization, technological development, and, above all, human-resources development?» Shiraishi's question – what to rely on? – touches on many of the questions raised in this book. The value of free markets is only one issue; there are numerous others, such as the role of bureaucracy and the importance of clear and correct information to the efficient running of a modern state. Getting Southeast Asia to «choose now» between the United States and Japan is Japan's last big bet at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Perhaps Japan will indeed win the bet and succeed in reviving its old hegemony over Southeast Asia. Backed by new industrial might based on control over Southeast Asia, and with a whole new continent of rivers and valleys to profitably cement over, Japan's academics and bureaucrats will not then feel that they need to give a backward glance at home to ravaged cities, sterile countryside, and a culture of big-eyed baby faces. All complaints can be easily dismissed as «Anglo-American triumphalism,» and Japan can revert happily to business as usual. Perhaps, but then again, perhaps not. For one thing, Southeast Asian nations may not feel that their only choice is between the United States and Japan, or that they have to make a