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By Root 2773 0

I agreed that we should respond in a measured, graduated way depending on the situation we faced. We foresaw four possibilities: a situation in which the use of force by the Polish Government against Polish workers was imminent, or had already taken place, or one in which Soviet intervention was imminent, or had already taken place. We agreed that ineffective sanctions would be worse than useless, but sanctions would have to hit the Soviets harder than they hit us. Meanwhile, we had to make a number of complex judgements about Soviet and the Polish Government’s intentions. Was the present ostentatious Warsaw Pact activity the prelude to armed intervention or a means of bringing political pressure to bear on the Polish Communist Party? If we continued to provide food aid and to proceed with plans for Polish debt relief would this benefit the Polish people or play into the hands of the hardliners in Poland who were struggling to survive the consequences of their own misgovernment? These were not easy judgements to make.

Suddenly the situation changed. Martial law was declared in Poland from midnight on 12–13 December 1981 and a ‘Military Council for National Salvation’ consisting of military leaders was set up under the Prime Minister, General Jaruzelski. The borders were sealed, telex and telephone links severed, a curfew imposed, strikes and assemblies banned, the broadcasting system brought under tight control. There was no doubt in my mind that all of this was morally unacceptable but that did not make it easier to gauge the correct response. After all, in order to warn off Soviet intervention, we had consistently said that the Poles must be allowed to decide on their own internal affairs. Were the Soviets themselves behind it, intending to use the crackdown as a means of turning the clock back to hardline communism and subordination to Moscow? Or was this really a temporary decision, as the Jaruzelski Government claimed, forced upon them to bring some kind of order to Poland, with the implication that this would prevent a Soviet takeover? At this early stage there was a severe shortage of information not just to illuminate these questions but even as to the whereabouts and safety of leading Polish dissidents.

The more we learnt of the background to what had happened, however, the worse it appeared. President Reagan was personally outraged by what had occurred, believed that the Soviet Union was behind it and was determined to take swift action. I received a message from him on 19 December to this effect. Al Haig sent a parallel message to Peter Carrington pointing out that the Americans were not proposing that the West should now implement the far-reaching measures to meet Soviet military intervention that had already been agreed in NATO. What they wanted were some political and economic measures at once and others in reserve if the situation worsened. Without any further reference to us, the Americans would be announcing sanctions against the Soviet Union later that day. These, we were were glad to note, rightly did not include abandonment of the disarmament talks going on in Geneva. But they did include measures such as the cancellation of Aeroflot landing rights, a halt to negotiations on a new long-term grain agreement (though an existing agreement would remain in place) and a halt to the export of material for the construction of the planned natural gas pipelines on which work had already begun.

It was this last point which was to be the cause of great anger in Britain and other European countries. British, German and Italian firms had legally binding contracts to provide equipment for the West Siberian Gas Pipeline, which involved components made in the United States or under United States licence. It was not clear at this stage whether the measures announced by President Reagan against the Soviet Union applied to existing contracts as well as new ones. If the ban extended to existing contracts this would deprive British firms of over £200 million of business with the Soviet Union. Worst affected would be a contract