Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [302]
In the Middle East, it was the Iran-Iraq War, with its undercurrent of destabilizing Muslim fundamentalism, which cost most lives and threatened most economic harm. But I always felt that the Arab-Israeli dispute was of even more abiding importance. For it was this which time and again prevented the emergence — at least until the Gulf War — of a solid bloc of more or less self-confident pro-western Arab states, no longer having to look over their shoulders at what their critics would make of the plight of the landless Palestinians.
Finally, in Africa — where, as in the Middle East, Britain was not just another player in the great game, but a country with historic links and a distinct, if not always favourable, image — it was the future of South Africa which dominated all discussion. For reasons which will become clear, no one had a better opportunity — or a more thankless task — than I did in resolving an issue which had poisoned the West’s relations with black Africa, left isolated the most advanced economic power in that continent and been used, incidentally, to justify more hypocrisy and hyperbole than I heard on any other subject.
THE FAR EAST
Hong Kong
My visit to China in September 1982 and my talks with Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping had had three beneficial effects.* First, confidence in Hong Kong about the future had been restored. Second, I now had a very clear idea of what the Chinese would and would not accept. Third, we had a form of words which both we and the Chinese could use about the future of Hong Kong which would provide a basis for continuing discussion between us. But there was a real risk that each of these gains would be transitory. Confidence in the colony was fragile. It was by no means clear how we could persuade the Chinese to be more forthcoming with their assurances. And — what I found most worrying — the Chinese proved very reluctant to get on with the talks which I had envisaged when I left Peking. For months nothing happened. I asked the advice of that old China hand, Henry Kissinger: his response was ‘don’t worry — that’s just their way.’ But I was worried and became more so as time passed.
On the morning of Friday 28 January 1983 I held a meeting with ministers, officials and the Governor of Hong Kong to review the position. We had learnt that in June the Chinese were proposing unilaterally to announce their own plan for Hong Kong’s future. We were all agreed that we must try to prevent this happening. I myself had been doing some fundamental rethinking about our objectives. I proposed that in the absence of progress in the talks we should now develop the democratic structure in Hong Kong as though it were our aim to achieve independence or self-government within a short period, as we had done with Singapore. This would involve building up a more Chinese government and administration in Hong Kong, with the Chinese members increasingly taking their own decisions and with Britain in an increasingly subordinate position. We might also consider using referenda as an accepted institution there. Since then legislative elections have demonstrated a strong appetite for democracy among the Hong Kong Chinese, to which the Government has had to respond. At that time, however, nobody else seemed much attracted by my ideas: and in the end I had reluctantly to concede that since the Chinese would not accept such an approach it was not then worth studying further. But I could not just leave things as they were, so in March 1983 I sent a private letter to Zhao Ziyang which broke the deadlock and got Anglo-Chinese talks off the ground again. This went marginally further than I had in Peking. There I had told Mr Deng that I would be prepared to consider making recommendations to Parliament about Hong Kong’s sovereignty if suitable arrangements could be made to preserve its stability