Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [308]
While in Japan I met the President of Nissan, whose company was considering at that time whether to go ahead with the construction of the plant it eventually built in Sunderland. We had a useful talk, though I could not at this stage draw from him any explicit commitment. Negotiations were at first known only to a small group. But agreement was finally reached in January 1984. I was convinced that the Nissan project made as much sense for Japan as it did for us. By exporting investment to Britain they would undercut protectionist pressures against them, bring in income for years ahead as well, of course, as providing incomes and jobs in the recipient country.
During my visit I also went to the Tsukuba Science City. This was fascinating. But I thought the decision to concentrate scientists in one particular location away from the great industrial centres was questionable. Interestingly, I found a number of Japanese who shared that view. This is all the more important because Japan’s research is often on the technological side, whereas, by contrast, Britain’s emphasis is on basic science. (Most of Japan’s advances in industry have come from the application of well-established scientific principles.)
At this time the export of Japanese machine tools to the West was one of the most vexed issues of dispute. At Tsukuba I saw just how advanced the Japanese were. I was photographed shaking hands with a robot and, to my astonishment, found that it even had smooth, delicately jointed fingers. It was a demonstration that the Japanese not only had advanced electronics: they had managed to develop and apply that technology far more successfully than we had.
Under Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan began to play a more active role in international affairs. So, when he made a visit to Britain in June 1984, I felt that I was dealing with a Japanese leader who understood and sympathized with western values and had shown that he was prepared to make steps in the right direction on economic policy. The talks I had with him in the morning and over lunch on Monday 11 June 1984 could, therefore, concentrate as much on wider international issues as on Anglo-Japanese bilateral trade disputes. Mr Nakasone gave me an account of his dealings with the Chinese. I told him about the state of our negotiations on Hong Kong. This was, of course, nearing the end of that period of freeze in the Cold War which preceded the advent of Mr Gorbachev. Mr Nakasone showed a shrewd understanding of what Japan’s role in these circumstances should be. He said that the Soviets would come out of their hibernation only when they decided to do so and that the West should wait for this. But he had continued to urge on the USSR the need for dialogue. He believed that the Soviets would need Japanese expertise and capital to develop Siberia and that this would in the long run be a powerful influence. In fact, this accurate and imaginative approach, which could yield enormous benefits, has still not been applied, mainly because of the dispute between (now) Russia and Japan over the Kurile Islands. I also discussed with Mr Nakasone Japanese investment in Britain. He said that half of the Japanese companies now established within the European Community were in the United Kingdom. ‘Not enough,’ I replied. ‘I would like two dozen more.’ He went away in no doubt about the welcome Britain would accord to Japanese investment.
My next visit to Tokyo was for the G7 economic summit in May 1986. The main issues at the summit were not economic at all but rather political. In the wake of the US-Libyan raid, international terrorism was the principal item on the agenda. The appalling consequences of the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl were also still being assessed and discussed. On terrorism I was determined to support the Americans with a strong statement in the communiqué. I was glad to learn from President Reagan when I saw him in Tokyo on