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By Root 3131 0

States, which was the power most responsible for the establishment of the state of Israel, will and must always stand behind Israel’s security. It is equally, though, right that the Palestinians should be restored in their land and dignity: and, as often happens in my experience, what is morally right eventually turns out to be politically expedient. Removing, even in limited measure, the Palestinian grievance is a necessary if not sufficient condition for cutting the cancer of Middle East terrorism out by the roots. The only way this can happen, as has long been clear, is for Israel to exchange ‘land for peace’, returning occupied territories to the Palestinians in exchange for credible undertakings to respect Israel’s security. It may be that the (thankfully ineffective) scud missile attacks of the Gulf War, demonstrating that Israel cannot preserve her security just by enlarging her borders, will eventually pave the way for such a compromise. That is to anticipate: for during my time as Prime Minister all initiatives eventually foundered on the fact that the two sides ultimately saw no need to adjust their stance. But that did not mean that we could simply sit back and let events take their course. Initiatives at least offered hope: stagnation in the Middle East peace process only ever promised disaster.

In September 1985 I visited the two key moderate Arab states, Egypt and Jordan. President Mubarak of Egypt had continued to pursue, though with greater circumspection, the policies of his assassinated predecessor, Anwar Sadat. King Hussein of Jordan had put forward a proposal for an international peace conference, as a prelude to which US Ambassador Murphy was to meet a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Egyptians were keen to see the Jordanian initiative succeed. But the sticking point was which Palestinian representatives would be acceptable to the Americans, who would have nothing directly to do with the PLO. President Mubarak felt that the Americans were not being sufficiently positive. I had some sympathy for this point of view, though I restated what I said was a cardinal principle for the US, as for Britain, that we would not agree to talks with those who practised terrorism. I felt that President Mubarak and I understood one another. He was a large personality, persuasive and direct — the sort of man who could be one of the key players in a settlement.

My main public gesture in Egypt on behalf of British business was the unromantic one of opening the British-built Cairo Waste Water Project, in effect the city’s sewer. But before leaving Egypt I made the statutory — though no less fascinating — tour of Karnak and Luxor. It was very hot. By this time I had learned my lesson: I had my own bottled mineral water with me in the car. But a minor disaster ensued when my staff, credulously believing that a bottle labelled mineral water at the museum actually contained such a thing, promptly all went down with severe stomach upsets. I suspect that they were even more pleased than I was when we arrived that evening (Wednesday 18 September) at Amman.

I already knew King Hussein well and liked him. He had come to see me in Downing Street on a number of occasions. Like President Mubarak, but more so, King Hussein was vexed with the Americans, believing that, having encouraged him to take a peace initiative, they were now drawing back under domestic Jewish pressure. I understood what he felt. He had been taking a real risk in trying to promote his initiative and I thought he deserved more support. I wanted to do what I could to help. So when the King told me that two leading PLO supporters would be prepared publicly to renounce terrorism and accept UNSCR 242 I said that if they would do this, I would meet them in London. I announced this at my press conference. It would have been the first meeting between a British minister and representatives of the PLO. Later, when they arrived in London, I checked to see if they were still prepared to adhere to these conditions. One did. But the other could not: he was afraid