Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [477]
But the atmosphere went from bad for worse. The others were determined to insert in the communiqué provisions on political union, none of which I was prepared to accept. I said that I would not pre-empt the debate in the IGC and had a unilateral observation to this effect incorporated in the text. They also insisted on following the German proposal that Stage 2 of monetary union should begin on 1 January 1994. I would not accept this either. I had inserted in the communiqué the sentence:
The United Kingdom, while ready to move beyond Stage 1 through the creation of a new monetary institution and a common Community currency, believes that decisions on the substance of that move should precede decisions on its timing.
They were not interested in compromise. My objections were heard in stony silence. I now had no support. I just had to say no.
In three years the European Community had gone from practical discussions about restoring order to the Community’s finances to grandiose schemes of monetary and political union with firm timetables but no agreed substance — all without open, principled public debate on these questions either nationally or in European fora. Now at Rome the ultimate battle for the future of the Community had been joined. But I would have to return to London to win another battle on which the outcome in Europe would depend — that for the soul of the Parliamentary Conservative Party.
* See pp. 405–6.
* At Fontainebleau — see pp. 541–5.
* The WEU was formed in 1948, principally for the purpose of military cooperation between Britain, France and the Benelux countries. Germany and Italy joined it in the 1950s. The WEU predated NATO, which has entirely overshadowed it.
* See pp. 413–4.
* For a full discussion of this issue, see pp. 786–7.
* See pp. 709–13.
* See pp. 168–71.
* See pp. 799–800, 842–6.
CHAPTER XXVI
The World Turned Right Side Up
The fall of communism in eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany
and the debate about the future of NATO — 1987–1990
OVERVIEW
The international scene in 1987 and 1988 was not so very different to that before the general election. President Reagan was in the White House, continuing the defence policies which time and again had forced the Soviets to the negotiating table. Mr Gorbachev was proceeding with increasingly far-reaching reforms in the Soviet Union which, whether he liked it or not, would eventually open the floodgates of democracy, if not prosperity. The West’s strategy of defeating communism while ensuring our peace and security — a strategy in which I believed with a passionate intensity and that I sought to communicate when I went to eastern Europe — was working. Its very success would mean that new questions about Britain’s foreign relations and NATO’s defences would arise.
Yet even before this happened the familiar landscape changed in another way I did not foresee. I had breathed a sigh of relief when George Bush defeated his Democrat opponent in the US presidential election, for I felt that it ensured continuity. But with the new team’s arrival in the White House I found myself dealing with an Administration which saw Germany as its main European partner in leadership, which encouraged the integration of Europe without seeming to understand fully what it meant and which sometimes seemed to underestimate the need for a strong nuclear defence. I felt I could not always rely as before on American co-operation. This was of great importance at such