Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [492]
As I have already argued, that is one reason why so many Germans genuinely — I believe wrongly — want to see Germany locked in to a federal Europe. In fact, Germany is more rather than less likely to dominate within that framework; for a reunited Germany is simply too big and powerful to be just another player within Europe. Moreover, Germany has always looked east as well as west, though it is economic expansion rather than territorial aggression which is the modern manifestation of this tendency. Germany is thus by its very nature a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing force in Europe. Only the military and political engagement of the United States in Europe and close relations between the other two strongest sovereign states in Europe — Britain and France — are sufficient to balance German power: and nothing of the sort would be possible within a European super-state.
One obstacle to achieving such a balance of power when I was in office was the refusal of France under President Mitterrand to follow his and French instincts and challenge German interests. This would have required abandoning the Franco-German axis on which he had been relying and, as I shall describe, the wrench proved just too difficult for him.
GERMAN REUNIFICATION
Initially, it also seemed likely that the Soviets would be strongly opposed to the re-emergence of a powerful Germany, particularly one reunited on the West’s terms and accompanied by the discrediting of communism. Of course, the Soviets might have calculated that a reunited Germany would return a left-of-centre government which would achieve their long-term objective of neutralizing and denuclearizing West Germany. (As it turned out — and perhaps with a clearer idea than we had of the true feelings of the East German people — the Soviets were prepared to sell reunification for a modest financial boost from Germany to their crumbling economy.)
These matters were at the forefront of my mind when I decided to arrange a stop-over visit in Moscow for talks with Mr Gorbachev on my way back from the IDU Conference in Tokyo in September 1989. In fact, my VC10 stopped first for refuelling in the Siberian town of Bratsk. I had two hours of conversation with the local Communist Party leaders over coffee in a chilly barn-like building. They seemed enthusiastic about perestroika, but I found the conversation flagging after an hour had been spent on the subject of the local beetroot crop. Stardom came to the rescue. John Whittingdale came in to ask if Oleg, the KGB guard outside the door, could have a signed photograph. I at once obliged. My hosts conferred in rapid Russian and then said that they too wanted signed photographs. The ice was broken.
In Moscow the following morning and over lunch Mr Gorbachev and I talked frankly about Germany. I explained to him that although NATO had traditionally made statements supporting Germany’s aspiration to be reunited, in practice we were rather apprehensive. Nor was I speaking for myself alone — I had discussed it with at least one other western leader, meaning but not mentioning President Mitterrand. Mr Gorbachev confirmed that the Soviet Union did not want German reunification either. This reinforced me in my resolve to slow up the already heady pace of developments. Of course, I did not want East Germans — any more than I would have wanted anyone else — to have to live under communism. But it seemed to me that a truly democratic East Germany would soon emerge and that the question of reunification was a separate one, on which the wishes and interests of Germany’s neighbours and other powers must be fully taken into account.
To begin with the West Germans seemed to be willing to do this. Chancellor Kohl telephoned me on the evening