Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [499]
The whole question of the future of the republics within the Soviet Union had by 1990 become the main source of controversy in Soviet political affairs. It was one of the subjects I had discussed with Mr Gorbachev on my stop-over visit in Moscow the previous September. He had just held a plenum on the nationalities question. There had also been some significant changes in the Politburo. The long-time communist leader in Ukraine, Mr Shcherbitsky, had left its ranks. Mr Pugo, previously the Latvian Party Chief- and one of the future coup leaders of 1991 — had been promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo. Mr Kryuchkov, Chairman of the KGB — also a coup leader — had been promoted to full membership. Mr Ryzhkov, with whom Mr Gorbachev was on close personal terms but who was quite out of his depth in dealing with the economy, remained as Prime Minister. Over lunch in the Kremlin Mr Gorbachev had recalled how General de Gaulle had once complained about the difficulties of ruling a country which had 200 cheeses: how much more difficult it was to rule one with 120 nationalities. ‘Especially when there is a shortage of cheese,’ chipped in Mr Albakin, the Deputy Prime Minister. And indeed frustrations at the failure of economic reform were increasingly expressed in national dissent as the months went by.
The emergence of Boris Yeltsin as a radical proponent of reform — both political and economic — ought perhaps to have strengthened Mr Gorbachev’s position. If the two of them had been able to sink their differences and if Mr Gorbachev had been prepared to cut his links with the Communist Party perhaps the impetus of reform might have been renewed. But these were two ‘ifs’ too many. Their relations remained bad and Mr Gorbachev remained a communist to the end.
There was a strong tendency in western circles to write off Mr Yeltsin as nothing more than a buffoon. I could not believe that this judgement — if such it can be called — was correct. But I wanted to see for myself. Consequently, although I was careful to notify Mr Gorbachev in advance and to make it clear that I was receiving Mr Yeltsin in the way that I would a Leader of the Opposition, I enthusiastically agreed to meet him when he came to London on the morning of Friday 27 April 1990. The briefing I had received about Mr Yeltsin sums up the attitude which was then prevalent. In this he was described as ‘a controversial figure’ because he had been the only member of the Party Central Committee to vote against the Draft Platform, arguing that it was the Communist Party’s long monopoly of power which had brought the USSR to its present crisis and driven tens of millions into poverty. He had said that democratic centralism should be rejected and replaced by genuine democracy and had called for a law on parties ending the Communist Party’s special status. Three cheers, I thought. My briefing went on to say — with less than complete perspicacity — that ‘some pundits even suggest that if [Mr Yeltsin] is elected as President of the Russian Federation he may end up with a more important job than Gorbachev’s presidency of a crumbling Union. This is an exaggeration.’
I only spoke with Mr Yeltsin for three-quarters of an hour. At first I was not quite sure what to make of him. He was far more my idea of the typical Russian than was Mr Gorbachev — tall, burly, square Slavic face and shock of white hair. He was self-confident without being self-assertive, courteous, with a smile full of good humour and a touch of self-mockery. But what impressed me most was that he had obviously thought through some of the fundamental problems much more clearly than had Mr Gorbachev. I began by saying that I supported Mr Gorbachev and wanted that to be clear from the outset. Mr Yeltsin replied that he knew I supported the Soviet leader and perestroika and on some of these matters our opinions differed, but basically he too supported Mr Gorbachev and the cause of reform.