Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [511]
Later that day I also had the sad duty of attending Ian Gow’s funeral. One of my most loyal and candid advisers, there were to be many times when I missed his shrewd counsel and his deadpan wit.
THE BUILD-UP TO WAR
I was not allowed by the Conservative Party to see through the campaign to throw Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. But in the months which now followed — and in spite of the other difficulties I faced — my attention was rarely away from the Gulf for long. I set up a small Cabinet sub-committee — Douglas Hurd (Foreign Secretary), Tom King (Defence Secretary), John Wakeham (Energy Secretary), Patrick Mayhew (Attorney-General), William Waldegrave (Minister of State at the Foreign Office), Archie Hamilton (Minister of State for the Armed Forces) and the Chief of the Defence Staff. It was this group, which met regularly, rather than the wider Cabinet Committee OD, which took the main decisions.
One of our first tasks was to provide the promised support for Saudi Arabia. On Thursday 9 August Tom King announced the despatch of two squadrons of aircraft — one made up of Tornado F3 air defence fighters and the other of Jaguar ground attack ‘planes, 24 aircraft in all. They were in place and operational two days later. Nimrod maritime reconnaisance and VC10 tanker aircraft were also sent. We reinforced them at the end of August with a further squadron of Tornados — but this time the GR1 ground-attack version — which were sent to Bahrain to provide a day-and-night anti-armour capability. Rapier air defence detachments were deployed in support.
Of course, I kept in frequent touch with President Bush over the telephone. I ensured that he was abreast of the military dispositions we were making and that we responded to American requests. We also regularly discussed the latest information about Saddam Hussein’s intentions. The general view seemed to be that whatever he had originally planned, he would not attack Saudi Arabia, once American forces were there. But it seemed to me that the important lesson for us was that Saddam Hussein was simply not predictable. As I put it in a minute to the Ministry of Defence on Sunday 12 August:
We thought that Iraq would not move into Kuwait, although their forces were massing on the border. Let us not make the same mistake again. They may move into Saudi Arabia. We must be ready.
These were weeks of vigorous telephone diplomacy. I encouraged Turkey in its steadfast opposition to Iraq. The Turkish economy was badly hit because — unlike Jordan — Turkey was applying UN sanctions effectively. I spoke to President Ozal about this over the telephone on Friday 24 August. He commiserated with me about what he described as Saddam Hussein’s disgraceful exploitation of British hostages on television. He thought that this exhibition had in fact worked against him and shown what sort of person he really was. I never failed to remind the Saudis and the governments of the Gulf States how much they owed to Turkey and urged them to offer generous financial compensation.
A less savoury ally against Saddam Hussein was Syria, with which we still had no formal diplomatic relations. I disliked the regime and had no illusion about its continued willingness to employ terrorism and violence if they suited its purposes. But the fact remained that the rivalry between Syria and Iraq gave us an opportunity which must not be missed. Moreover, it made no sense to have our forces fighting alongside the Syrians if we still had no diplomatic channels for discussion. Reluctantly, therefore, I agreed to the reopening of diplomatic relations, though the formal announcement came a few days after I left office