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By Root 3101 0

equipment and plenty of it. The Americans wanted us to reinforce our troops in the Gulf and had suggested that we should send an armoured brigade equipped with Challenger I tanks to join the Allied Forces there. I knew that the Challenger had a good reputation for manoeuvrability, but a bad one for reliability. So on Thursday 13 September I called a meeting with Tom King, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chief of the General Staff and representatives of Vickers. I cross-questioned them about all the possible weaknesses. I could not forget the way in which the earlier American attempt under President Jimmy Carter to rescue the Iranian hostages had failed because the helicopters used had been unable to cope with the desert conditions. After much discussion they convinced me. But I said that they must take all the spare parts they could possibly need with them, not wait for more to be sent out, and I also insisted upon receiving a written guarantee of 80 per cent availability — several times better than Challenger had achieved in Germany.

I also wanted the commander of our forces to be someone in whom I — and they — would have complete confidence. The MoD came up with several names but only one man seemed to be right for the job — Sir Peter de la Billière. Tom King was reluctant to see him appointed: Peter de la Billière was within a week of retiring and the other candidates clearly had much to be said for them. But I wanted a fighting general. I knew the qualities of Sir Peter from his command of the SAS operation at the time of the 1980 Iranian Embassy siege* and from the Falklands. I also knew that he spoke Arabic — of some importance when part of a large multi-national force with a crucial Arab element. So I told Tom King that Sir Peter was not retiring now if I had anything to do with it: and if he did not go to command our forces in the Gulf, he would be coming as personal adviser on the conduct of the war to Downing Street. He went to the Gulf.

I telephoned George Bush the next morning to tell him that I was about to announce the decision to send the 7th Armoured Brigade to the Gulf, comprising two armoured regiments with 120 tanks, a regiment of Field Artillery, a battalion of armoured infantry, anti-tank helicopters and all the necessary support. It would be a completely self-supporting force, numbering up to 7,500. They were the successors to the ‘Desert Rats’ of Alamein. The President was pleased. ‘My heavens, a marvellous commitment; this is really something,’ he said.

I met the President again in New York on the evening of Sunday 30 September. We were officially there to attend the ‘UN Children’s Summit’, an occasion at which the only high point was an inspiring speech from President Havel of Czechoslovakia. President Bush was very tired, having flown back to Washington from New York to complete negotiations with Congress on the fateful 1990 budget compromise, which was to undermine him politically, before returning for this meeting. But he was in good spirits. We discussed Jim Baker’s wish for another UN Security Council Resolution specifically to endorse the use of force to bring about Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. As always, I was dubious, preferring to rely on Article 51. But what was clear to all of us was that the time for using force was now rapidly approaching. There was no evidence that sanctions were having any real effect on Iraq’s decisions — and that was what counted. I was clearer than ever in my mind that there could be no weakening in our resolve to defeat — and be seen to defeat — Saddam Hussein’s aggression.

As so often over these months I found myself reliving in an only slightly different form my experiences of the build-up to the battle for the Falklands. There is never any lack of people anxious to avoid the use of force. No matter how little chance there is of negotiation succeeding — and no matter how many difficulties are created for the troops who are trying to prepare themselves for war — the case is always made for yet another piece of last-ditch diplomacy.

On this occasion