Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [98]
We have long known that the 1980s will be a difficult and dangerous decade. There will be crises and hardships. But I believe the tide is beginning to turn in our favour. The developing world is recognizing the realities of Soviet ambitions and Soviet life. There is a new determination in the western alliance. There is new leadership in America, which gives confidence and hope to all in the free world.
VISITS TO INDIA AND THE GULF
On 20 May 1980 I had held a meeting to consider a subject which the Russian invasion of Afghanistan had belatedly placed near the top of the western international agenda — how to prevent Soviet expansion in the developing world. With a revivified United States, the possibilities had now been transformed. But I never doubted that, over and above the role of ally and friend to the United States, there was much that Britain could achieve and that no one else could. The Left would have it that the legacy of the British empire was one of bitterness and impoverishment in the former colonies: this was a grossly distorted and inaccurate view. Nor for the most part did those with whom I dealt in these countries see Britain in that light. Sweep away some of the rhetoric and with the exception of certain issues, like relations with South Africa, you will find that no country is as trusted in every continent as Britain. In 1981 I began to make more systematic use of these relationships to promote the interests of Britain and the wider objectives of the West.
On Wednesday 15 April 1981 I began a visit to India. I had visited the country twice and met Mrs Indira Gandhi, India’s Prime Minister, three times before. However, the strategic importance of India was now greater. India had been making economic progress, particularly in the crucial sector of agriculture. It was one of the leading countries in the non-aligned movement — still more so since the death of Marshal Tito. That group of nations was itself more important to us because of its attitude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. India could be an even more powerful source of difficulty than benefit if she chose. Her traditionally closer relations with Russia and hostility to Pakistan, at a time when the latter was the main base for the Afghan anti-communist guerillas, meant that the West had to be sensitive to the Indian Government’s feelings and needs. As regards bilateral relations, there was also the thorny question of the new and much misrepresented British Nationality Bill, which was a part of our proposals to limit future large-scale immigration to Britain — not least immigration from the Indian sub-continent.
My talks with Mrs Gandhi were interesting, but largely inconclusive. Much of the time of the Indian Cabinet seemed to be spent in allocating contracts — not perhaps too surprising in a socialist country — whereas I was more concerned with international questions. I did not manage to persuade Mrs Gandhi to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as I would have liked. She put up the standard excuses, but she was clearly embarrassed by it. I never succeeded in drawing Mrs Gandhi or her successors away from India’s traditional alliance with the Soviet Union until the collapse of communism, or in drawing her closer to America. But we established a good Anglo-Indian working relationship in Commonwealth affairs, and on the practicalities of Third World aid, where she had a much more hard-headed grasp of what was required than most other Third World leaders. This good relationship was not soured for long by the dispute over the British Nationality Bill. She pressed strongly for amendments to it that would have permitted more Indian families to be admitted to Britain: I stood my ground in defence of the bill. My impression was that although the attack was pressed home privately and publicly — at the