Dr. Seuss and Philosophy - Jacob M. Held [102]
On the other hand, Hume saw what we think of as “morality” as a product of our contingent empirical psychology, not as the immutable workings of reason itself. Given the kind of creatures we are, we happen to feel certain things, and some of these things we feel so deeply and reliably that they are well-entrenched sentiments, not just passing fancies. Take these feelings away from us and we would be very different creatures. Indeed, take our capacity and proclivity for sympathy away and morality would be something else entirely.
Unlike Kant, Hume didn’t worry about any necessary universal foundation for morality. He thought we were alike enough that one could make some meaningful observations about morality for humanity in general, but this had to do with the contingent fact that we happened to feel and want many of the same things, not because we absolutely had to feel and want them under pain of irrationality. As Hume said in his Treatise, “’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”3 Had he come across a Grinch who preferred to see the Whos destroyed in this fashion, he would have thought the Grinch a terrible, nasty fellow, but the flaw would’ve been a problem with his feelings, not his powers of reasoning.
A great deal hangs on this contrast between Kant and Hume, not just in cases of some dramatic change of heart like we see with the Grinch but in the more mundane shape and everyday orbit of human lives. The key question is whether Kant is right to put reason at the helm with the emotions playing a subsidiary role at best, whether Hume portrays us as we really are, as creatures whose ultimate ends are given not by reason but by feeling in one form or another, or whether there is some other middle way between these two very different views of human character and moral goodness.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Thidwick the Big-Hearted
Bearer of Property Rights
Aeon J. Skoble
Moose have large horns. It’s not unreasonable to wonder whether some of that space could be used for something. If a moose wanted corporate sponsorship, for example, one could place logos on the horns. In Dr. Seuss’s story, Thidwick the Big-Hearted Moose, a different use is proposed, and disastrous consequences ensue. In a charitable gesture, Thidwick allows a Bingle Bug to ride on his horns. But the Bingle Bug then invites dozens of other creatures to establish homes on Thidwick’s horns. They then claim to have formed a community, with an entitlement to property rights on Thidwick’s horns. Their exercise of their alleged rights turns out to place Thidwick’s life in jeopardy. In this essay, I will argue that the “guests” did not in fact have any rights to live on the horns and that Thidwick was mistaken in letting his big-heartedness be used against him by the other creatures. This will allow us to see something about the nature of property rights.
Would You, Could You, Get off My Head?
The plot follows the pattern of the slippery slope: the Bingle Bug, put out by it being a hot day, asks Thidwick for permission to ride on his horns. Thidwick reasons, correctly, that a tiny bug riding on his horns will not be an inconvenience at all, so he grants the bug’s wish. But the bug invites more and more creatures until it really is an inconvenience for Thidwick. Thidwick feels as though he cannot protest the inconvenience on the grounds that “a host above all must be nice to his guests” (Thidwick). But this is where Thidwick’s reasoning becomes flawed: they aren’t his guests. The bug, not Thidwick, invites the other creatures, who themselves go on to take advantage. For example, the bug invites a bird, then the bird takes a wife, and then the bird asks both his wife and her uncle to move on as well. Thidwick is mistaken in regarding them as guests just as they are mistaken in thinking they are entitled to live there. But later, this mistake leads to further problems: when Thidwick decides to go to the other side of Lake Winna-bango, the creatures protest: “You’ve no right to take