Dr. Seuss and Philosophy - Jacob M. Held [110]
Whenever the legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience. . . . [Authority] devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society.10
Mack has the right idea; it is time to be rid of King Yertle. But what ought to replace him? What principles of government would best represent all turtle interests? Surely, Mack wants to respect his fellow turtles and their freedom. He doesn’t merely want a new king, or to be king himself. Mack is about justice, isn’t he?
Free and Rational Turtles
There is only one innate right, freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with universal law.
—Immanuel Kant11
For Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), rational individuals have an innate freedom—a freedom, it turns out, that can only be preserved within civil society. “Freedom” means something very specific for Kant: the right to choice; that is, to deliberative actions. To speak of “rights,” then, is to speak of actions that have an influence over the choices of other rational beings. In this way, the interest of the state isn’t so much the welfare of its citizens but rather to guarantee the largest possible amount of self-determination for its citizens. In a sense then, the worst thing that can be done to a rational individual is to make decisions for her; that is, to infantilize her. As Kant puts it, “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.”12 So, individual freedom of action amounts to a lack of constraint imposed by the choices of others. The state then acts to constrain choices only if not doing so would result in constraining the choices of others. As such, the state is a necessary condition for—and a means to—securing freedom.
As we are equally free, we are equally subject to the laws of (and opportunities in) the state. The social contract then captures restrictions upon actions available to the state; or, as Kant puts it, the sovereign must “give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting for such a will.”13 So, it’s reason that establishes the social contract, such that no law may come to pass that “a whole people could not possibly give its consent to.”14 On the one hand, consider a law granting access to Sala-ma-Sond’s library only to turtles with striped shells: such a law would be unjust as it would be irrational for those without stripes to accept fewer privileges for themselves. On the other hand, imagine a law establishing a tax to build that library. Assuming that the tax is administered equitably, it would be just. Even if a particular turtle objects to financing library construction, it may be being built for legitimate reasons known to the state but not to that individual. That is, if the rational citizen did have full knowledge of the project, she would give her consent.
While the state embodies the social contract as it does with Locke and Hobbes, for Kant the contract is not an instrumental thing resulting from the voluntary, self-interested deal making of individuals.