Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [109]
Losing an Empire
The Parliament in Westminster dispersed for its summer vacation after hearing the prime minister's survey of military and diplomatic affairs, delivered with an unmistakeable note of victory. In June 1944 Allied military forces liberated Rome, Operation Overlord successfully began the re-invasion of occupied France and in Eastern Europe Russian troops were advancing along a huge front. In Burma Commonwealth forces—not just British but also Indian and native African troops—were pushing the Japanese onto the defensive. American-led forces were on the point of expelling the Japanese from northern New Guinea and Admiral Nimitz had defeated the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Philippine Sea. Although there was still a great deal of fighting ahead the end could be seen and the Dominions were centrally involved: New Zealand and South African troops were heavily committed in Italy, the large Canadian land force was playing a key role in north-west Europe, Australian forces were proving their worth in New Guinea. This did not include, of course, the continuing efforts of Dominion sailors and airmen who had fought the longest war on the seas and in the air in various theatres throughout the course of the global conflict.1
Adding to Churchill's sense of well-being, the meeting of the Empire's prime ministers had also been a great success and the unity of the coalition never appeared to have been stronger. The British leader had himself described it as the 'highest pinnacle' to which this 'worldwide family organization' had yet reached. As The Round Table warned, however, great as the achievement had been, there was a need to beware, the danger being that 'hope and resolve' might turn into 'complacency and inaction'. This august monitor of Imperial affairs had detected a problem, the relationship of the last five years had been based upon a common goal, defeating the aggressor, but post-war Commonwealth relations would be different. Each of the Dominions was bound not just by the value which it attached to its historical position in the Empire but also its regional position and the development of a future international security organization. 'As nations they pursue their separate national interests; as members of the group they share the group responsibilities as well as the group resources.' It was indeed potentially something of a paradox.2
The recent London meeting had been keenly watched on the other side of the Atlantic. Halifax had telegraphed back from Washington just before its start to say that the decisions that were reached would likely have considerable influence on American policymakers. As he put it, 'if the result demonstrates Commonwealth solidarity respect for us will increase and vice versa'. He cautioned, however, that any reference to Imperial Preference, or indeed economic questions in general could prove disastrous, having a negative impact on willingness to consider plans for cooperation and the attitude towards Lend-Lease. If this could be avoided he believed it would encourage a desire to work with the Commonwealth. He believed 'a good deal would depend on this' and the FO generally agreed with his comments. Post-Conference the department concluded that American opinion thought Mackenzie King had triumphed in defeating calls for the Commonwealth to be more coordinated and centralized. He had also successfully opposed the efforts of those Dominion leaders who wanted the Commonwealth bloc to have a bigger say in the discussions about the post-war organization. Nonetheless it was also believed that the outcome should have been satisfactory to both American and the British alike, confirming that 'the Commonwealth can no longer be regarded as an end in itself' and showing the rest of the world that 'the Commonwealth is far from moribund'.3
The only concern was that the American press was judged not really to have realized the Conference's significance; radio comments