Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [111]
Another key tool in this research process was the FO's memorandum on the future of the Empire which had been distributed the previous year and was generating a 'flood of suggestions' from the overseas embassies. Perhaps the most incisive of these came from Halifax, fresh from his recent brush with Dominion sensitivities.11 He offered a both perceptive and far-sighted view, taking issue with the central idea that Britain could preserve its 'Great Power' status without the support of the Dominions. He recognized the changing nature of the relationship, even if some of his colleagues in London did not, and disagreed with the notion that there could remain 'any lingering tendency to assume that the members of the Commonwealth are in any way less than equal'. He counselled that there should no longer be talk of 'preserving' or 'maintaining' the Commonwealth 'as if it were a venerable but hoary building which has to be shored and buttressed if it is not to tumble down'. Not until October 1944 was a précis available of all the responses, and it took the form of a draft FO programme for promoting better Commonwealth cooperation. All new candidates for the Foreign Service would be encouraged to spend part of their training period in a Dominion and refresher courses of lectures on the British Commonwealth and Empire would be given to serving officials. It was also agreed that members of the DO would, in appropriate cases, be attached to British Embassies where other Commonwealth governments were represented and junior FO staff would be attached to the High Commissions in Canada and South Africa. Even nomenclature was considered. Reminding the reader that the term 'Commonwealth' actually connoted Britain and the Dominions, it was stressed that it whenever possible would be well received. One oft-advanced suggestion which it was agreed not to include was that the DO and FO should be amalgamated; despite the obvious lingering contempt shown by many of the ambassadors it remained official policy that relations with the Dominions required special handling and their own Whitehall department.
The DO was generally content with the submission. There were, however, some reservations about the 'somewhat patronizing tone' in places and the degree to which the special nature of the relationship between Britain and the Dominions was not necessarily brought out. The British high commissioners in their distant outposts had also been asked for their views about this document. From the High Commission in Ottawa, despite not agreeing with all of the points that were made, it was seen as encouraging that the FO should be taking an interest in Commonwealth matters. There were, however, some telling criticisms. The paper appeared to have been written from a 'superior standpoint', one which seemed 'to regard the Dominions as strange animals which require special treatment'. The Dominions were in fact 'good friends or ours', who if treated in an adult way as being able to 'form their own views' could be of great help, not only in terms of defining the future relationship but also helping find common ground with the United States. There were also some agreement with Halifax and his doubts that Britain could be a Great Power without the Dominions. Batterbee thought it to be generally sound both in terms of the picture it presented and the conclusions it reached. He did, however, note that the memorandum failed to carry any disclaimer saying that it did not represent the official view of the government and worried about this omission presumably because of how it might have been interpreted by certain of his diplomatic colleagues. In his view Britain held its position in the world because it had 'long been regarded as the champion of political liberty'.