Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [113]
At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, held near Washington in August and September 1944, the four 'Great Powers' attempted to draft specific proposals for a charter for the new organization. It was clear that there were considerable differences of opinion, particularly over the issue sponsored by the Americans that the Permanent Members of the proposed Security Council should have a right of veto on any decision which potentially affected their own interests. The Soviets had a different view and were adamant that only the four principals should have any form of vote.20 So great were the disagreements that it proved necessary to hold another series of discussions about the structure of the proposed World Organization. This was held at the Crimea resort of Yalta in early February 1945; once again the Dominions were not represented in person but, instead, had to rely upon Britain to safeguard their interests.21 One of the British officials who had been at the Dumbarton Oaks talks admitted that the attitude of the British delegation there changed 'in a rather remarkable way' during the course of the talks. Initially there was strong indignation at what were considered to be 'disreputable' proposals from the Russians that would 'place the Great Powers above the law'. In time the British came to see that this view was actually quite 'realistic' and that to oppose it would have been hypocritical and akin to the worst days of the League of Nations.22
Cranborne had striven at every opportunity to cajole Churchill into keeping the Dominions fully informed about developments affecting the proposed post-war security organization. They had been equally forceful in turn in making it clear how much they disliked any system under which the smaller powers were to be treated differently. The Dominions secretary's argument, that he had made repeatedly to the prime minister, was if they were consulted on the proposals at the formative stage it would not then later appear that they were being approached merely for their acquiescence in a policy that had already been settled in London.23 This was sage advice as it remained the issue about which the Dominions had indicated from the outset of the war that they were most sensitive. As Cranborne now noted, any suggestion that the British government endorsed the idea of regional blocs would likely make it 'most difficult' to bring the Dominions into line. The announcement from the White House in the spring of 1945 that it had been agreed at Yalta that it would be acceptable for the United States and the Soviet Union to have three votes each only served to make the situation worse.24 The British government had not actually been consulted about this proposal in advance, not for the first