Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [147]
19 Sir Arthur Fadden, They Called Me Artie (Melbourne, 1969), pp. 73-8; Sir Arthur Fadden, 'Forty Days and Forty Nights: Memoir of a Wartime Prime Minister', Australian Outlook (Vol. 27; 1973), pp. 9-11.
20 Cranborne to Churchill, 22 April 1941, PREM3/206/1-3; Fadden, They Called Me Artie, pp. 58-9; Judith Brett, Robert Menzies' Forgotten People (Australia, 1992), pp. 250-1.
21 Day, The Great Betrayal, pp. 153-5; Horner, High Command, Australia and Allied Strategy (Sydney, 1982), pp. 100-13; Halifax to FO, 12 June 1941, FO371/27575.
22 Menzies to Churchill, 20 July 1941, DAFP V; ibid., Churchill to Menzies, 9 August 1941.
23 Horner, High Command, pp. 104-17. Blamey was even willing to make the dubious claim that his troops in Tobruk should be replaced because they were no longer medically capable of its defence; Blamey to General Auchinleck, 18 July 1941 cited in Robertson and McCarthy, Australian War Strategy, pp. 125-6; Duffy (Acting Official Secretary) to DO, 25 February 1946, DO35/1767.
24 Sebastian Cox, '"The Difference between White and Black": Churchill, Imperial Politics and Intelligence before the 1941 Crusader Offensive', Intelligence and National Security (Vol. 9, No. 3; July 1994), pp. 413-15; Fadden to Churchill, 5 September 1941, PREM3/63/2; ibid., Churchill to Auchinleck, 6 September 1941.
25 Auchinleck to Churchill, 10 September 1941, DO35/1009/446/1/40.
26 Diary, 3 October 1941, Massey Papers.
27 Lyttelton to Churchill, 11 September 1941, PREM3/63/2.
28 R. James (ed.), Victor Cazalet (London, 1976), p. 264; Diary, 15 September 1941, Harvey Papers
29 Cranborne to Emrys-Evans, 31 August 1941, Emrys-Evans Papers; WCM(41)92, 11 September 1941, CAB65/23.
30 Churchill to Fadden, 11 September 1941, PREM3/63/2; ibid., Fadden to Churchill, 15 September 1941; Fadden, They Called Me Artie, p. 77.
31 'Auchinleck Overruled During Tobruk Siege: Australia Insisted On Relief of Her Troops' (Lt-Gen H. G. Martin, Military Correspondent), Daily Telegraph, 22 August 1946.
32 Churchill to Fadden, 29 September 1941, PREM3/63/2; ibid., Fadden to Churchill, 4 October 1941; Churchill to Cranborne, 15 September 1941.
33 Ibid., Churchill to Lyttelton, 18 September 1941; minute by Pugh, 25 July 1945, DO35/1767; ibid., DO minute, 13 September 1945; Holdgate to Antrobus, 13 September 1945; minute by Antrobus, 13 September 1945.
34 Hasluck, The Government and the People, pp. 510-18.
35 Ross, John Curtin, pp. 214-19.
36 War Cabinet Defence Committee, 5 March 1941, cited in J. M. McCarthy, 'Australia: A View from Whitehall, 1939-1945', Australian Outlook (No. 28; 1974), p. 325.
37 Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, pp. 21-2; Horner, High Command, pp. 137-40; The Times, 25 August 1939.
38 Cross to Cranborne, June 1944, Machtig Papers, DO121/111; Brooke-Popham to Ismay, 28 February 1941, Brooke-Popham Papers.
39 Day, The Great Betrayal, p. 188; Cox, 'The Difference between White and Black', pp. 416-17; Horner, High Command, p. 123.
40 It is easy to see why it has been described as a long, slow game, one that wavered between, conciliatory diplomacy, economic blackmail and downright appeasement at the basis of which lay the panacea, 'Main Fleet to Singapore', John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 130-1; John McCarthy, 'Singapore and Australian Defence, 1921-1942', Australian Outlook, (Vol. 25; 1971), pp. 165-79; Ian Cowman, Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 37-9.
41 For example the Review of Imperial Defence and the Far Eastern Appreciation, two major documents produced by the British chiefs of staff as preparation for the 1937 Imperial Conference; W. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base (London, 1979), pp. 129-31; A. C. Welburn, 'The Singapore Strategy: Half-Truths, Evasion and Outright Deception', Australian Defence Force Journal (No. 100; May/June 1993), pp. 39-48.
42 'Imperial Naval Policy', Committee of Imperial Defence (Minutes