Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [30]
It was against this backdrop that the First Canadian Division began to disembark at Scottish ports, the first contingent of Dominion troops to arrive on British shores. Within weeks both the First Echelon of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force and Australia's Sixth Division had also sailed from their respective home ports heading for the European war theatre. With the commitment of these troops, it was widely hoped within Whitehall that the Dominions would now develop a far greater interest in the war. The reality was that, preoccupied by domestic concerns and what some London-based commentators referred to as 'strong inferiority complexes', there still remained a clear lack of willingness to actively participate in the war's direction.64 Typical of this was Canada where, in January 1940, Mackenzie King had sensed the moment was propitious to capitalize on his earlier hard-worked intrigues and had called a general election. Privately Whitehall was alive with speculation that his defeat would be no bad thing, this in part fuelled by reports from the British high commissioner that the Canadian leader had 'dug his own [political] grave'.65 The authorities in South Africa were also still struggling to 'come into the war' as the bitterness created by the previous September's political crisis continued to prove divisive.66 Despite this, key figures in London had yet to grasp that their alliance partners' attention lay elsewhere. The War Cabinet was now focused on British strategy in Scandinavia, Churchill persisting with his long-standing proposals to send an Allied Expeditionary Force to secure the Norwegian port of Narvik. The Dominions' response when asked for their views about this idea and, specifically, whether a more vigorous approach was required, was guarded. Indeed they offered little other than the standard rejection of any move which might lead to a worsening of the existing situation.67 The high commissioners were much more openly critical; Bruce had long regarded any move into Norway or its surrounding waters to be 'extremely dangerous' and instead suggested a much more vigorous propaganda campaign be conducted.68 Eden said little to this, his attentions focused on proposals for a summer visit to Canada, but elsewhere in Whitehall there was widespread scorn among those who heard this particular contribution to the debate.69
The German invasion of Norway, in the first week of April 1940, surprised the War Cabinet and the Dominions who were mentally unprepared and still fixed largely on domestic concerns.70 Menzies, who was keenest that some form of direct assistance should be provided, had recently announced the successful conclusion of negotiations with Sir Earle Page putting to an end a spat that has soured relations between the two. As a result Page's Country Party would now join in a coalition with his Australia Party. This was obviously a positive step but the political situation nonetheless still remained fragile.71 In Canada Mackenzie King's general election victory had been assessed by the FO as leaving a leader in charge in Ottawa who would 'remain lukewarm about war measures which cannot be shown to be to [his] advantage'.72 Sydney Waterson, at South Africa House, was almost alone therefore in responding optimistically to the recent turn of events and he felt more cheerful because the coalition needed 'a kick in the pants before we really get down to a war'.73 As a military catastrophe unfolded on the far side of the North Sea, the most important question for him was the position of the Dominions in relation to the Supreme War Council. When this had been reconstituted