Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [47]
This announcement was not well received in Ottawa. MacDonald sent three private notes to the DO at the beginning of August in which he detailed the events of the last few weeks. So sensitive did he feel these to be that he attached a strong plea to Cranborne not to pass on anything that might upset Churchill and lead to a serious quarrel 'between him and one or more of the Dominion prime ministers'.69 This was a necessary warning in light of what he had to say; despite the high commissioner's reassurances that Mackenzie King admired his British counterpart enormously, there were apparently those in his cabinet who had described Churchill as a 'cad' for what he had said.70 More significantly there had also been further proposals from Menzies for a London meeting, this time in a private telegram sent in mid-July 1941 to both the Canadian and Smuts. In this the Australian had outlined his concerns about how the war was being run from London, and reiterated the need for some form of permanent Dominion representation in the British War Cabinet. MacDonald thought the Canadian leader should attend but his host disliked what he saw as an attempt by Menzies to drag him into 'his personal ambitions'. The continuing intrigues left Cranborne angry for as he explained to MacDonald, they confirmed his own conversations with Menzies back in May. During these he had freely told the Dominions secretary, even though he knew him to be one of Churchill's ministers and friends, that he was prepared to give up the Australian leadership if necessary and enter British politics after the war with the aim of one day becoming the leader of the Conservative Party. The infuriated secretary of state roundly condemned Menzies for a 'not very pretty role' motivated 'to a considerable extent by personal motives'.71 The Australian was increasingly desperate to be invited back to London, so much so that he asked Bruce to 'have a confidential chat with [Max] Beaverbrook' to assess his prospects.72 Although appearing reluctant to tell Churchill the extent of Menzies' intrigues, the Dominions secretary at the same time discussed the scheming that had been taking place with Eden, one of the so-called 'Yes-Men' whom Menzies had so indiscreetly referred to on numerous occasions. The foreign secretary was asked for his comments on the potential constitutional problems that any move to include Menzies in the War Cabinet might entail. He was clearly concerned by what he heard, his secretary Oliver Harvey noting his particular worries about Menzies' potential return to London and a likely attempt 'to [try and] get into English politics via the War Cabinet'.73
With events in the Australian capital moving towards their conclusion, Mackenzie King arrived in London a victim of domestic public pressure that he should make such a trip. Initially scheduled for late August he had wavered to the last moment, Churchill's conference with President Roosevelt, held off the coast of Newfoundland, ultimately proving decisive.74 Not wishing Mackenzie King to be involved, the British prime minister had deliberately kept details of his mission vague, only telling him he was going after pleas from within the Cabinet Office in London. The Canadian had been embarrassed and now needed to save face by being seen to be briefed in person by Churchill. As MacDonald again took the opportunity to point out to Cranborne, the Canadian had been consistently critical of Menzies' schemes and he hoped that this loyalty would be highlighted to Churchill if the opportunity arose.75 Mackenzie King, meanwhile, saw in his visit an opportunity to discuss Menzies' proposals in person with one of his Dominion colleagues. The New Zealand leader, Peter Fraser, had also been in London to meet the British government, and remained purposely to see his counterpart. Speaking privately to him he made it quite clear that he felt it would be inappropriate 'to give the impression that people here can't do the job'. He had sat in a number