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By Root 946 0

domestic distractions remained broadly to the fore while New Zealand's voice was also still only rarely raised and even more rarely heard.75 Perhaps the greatest revelation was the degree to which even the Australian government appeared to have fallen noticeably more in line with British thinking. Curtin and his fellow ministers had found many domestic political distractions to occupy themselves as generally positive messages from London and Washington and the optimistic assessments of various British visitors helped ease fears of a possible Japanese attack.76 Such was the growing optimism that parliament was even told in early November there was now no desire by the government to recall the AIF and an earlier decision to send an Armoured Division to the Middle East was confirmed.77 Announcements such as these perhaps helped to explain why the complacency among the Australian public, which British high commissioners had referred to in the past, had if anything become worse.

High profile public criticism of London seemed to come almost solely from Dr Herbert Evatt, Curtin's Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs. Elected to parliament in 1940, as a justice in the Australian High Court he had previously been a vocal supporter of greater federal powers. His public censure of Britain's failure speedily to declare war on Finland, Hungary and Romania, each of which had sided with Nazi Germany following the latter's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, was but one example of the many complaints he had to make. On this occasion though, Churchill responded with a stiff rebuke to Canberra, forcing even Curtin to apologise.78 The reports reaching London about the attitude of the Australian leader were in fact favourable in tone, offering a far more optimistic assessment of his character and abilities than had initially been the case. In mid-October 1941 Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham visited Canberra, as commander-in-chief Far East, to offer reassurance that regional security was not being neglected by the chiefs of staff in faraway London. He subsequently provided a detailed analysis for the British authorities of what he had found and perhaps key amongst the points raised was the degree to which he had been impressed by the Australian leader. Equally impressed was Duff Cooper when, in November 1941, he was sent to Canberra to 'tell the Australians how wonderful they are and how almost as wonderful we are'. In a subsequent private letter to Cranborne he recorded that Curtin was 'a modest, sincere, intelligent and honest man and is generally regarded as such'.79

Despite such positive words the Australian leader actually remained greatly distressed about the security situation in the Far East. In mid-November 1941 his chiefs of staff had presented a report to him which made it clear Malaya could not be defended in the event of a major attack by Japan.80 This led to another strongly worded telegram to Whitehall, sent on the first day of December, in which the British government was reminded of its previous promises that there would be strong defences at Singapore. Before any response could be given Japanese forces attacked the US Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor and various other British and American targets in the Pacific and South East Asia. As Waterson put it, 'the Japs have gone over the top' and he believed there to be 'a reasonable chance of this year being the last year of the war', although it was not entirely clear who he thought would emerge victorious.81 Churchill immediately hurried to Washington, against the advice of a number of his War Cabinet colleagues, not merely to coordinate the finer details of how the newly expanded alliance would function but also to ensure guarantees about the 'Hitler first' strategy. More commonly referred to by its short 'ABC-1' title, this proposal had originally been agreed in early 1941 during the Washington Staff Conversations. The future Allied effort was to be focused on the European theatre, not the Far East, and the prime minister did not want to