Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [86]
The continued close cooperation of the Dominions was clearly paramount to Britain, and this could only be secured if they were satisfied that their interests and position were being safeguarded. This was the conclusion of a memorandum issued by the FO in December 1943 the specific focus of which was the British Commonwealth's future. Eden had produced another War Cabinet paper in November 1942 in which he stated that if the British Empire and Commonwealth could not be maintained Britain could no longer exist as a world power.59 The new document, barely three pages in length, incorporated a vast sweep of the subject. Its aim was reportedly to help stimulate debate in overseas missions about how foreign relations involving the Empire—specifically methods of exchanging information, consultation and cooperation—might be conducted post-war.60 Caveats were added about how difficult it was to foretell the future and that in order to safeguard brevity the Dominions had been treated as one when in fact it was recognized that 'each has its particular characteristics, interests and problems, and will increasingly develop and assert its own national individuality'. The DO had little involvement in its preparation, a draft being submitted for comments, some of which were adopted. The result was that it was distributed without any departmental objection but, equally, without its endorsement. Attlee doubted whether the Dominions would be willing to accept the idea that Britain might be a member of the proposed post-war international organization, the so-called 'Four-Power Council', without there being any separate representation for them.61
This first warning had been made at the beginning of 1943 and would remain a much repeated one throughout the discussions that continued on the matter over the coming months.62 As Attlee, in his dual role as deputy prime minister and secretary of state, put it to those present at a meeting in the DO held on April Fool's Day 1943—two of the four Dominions high commissioners being amongst them—the problem was that both the United States and the Soviet Union were only prepared to accept a single voice in discussing questions of general policy.63 There were obvious areas for which this presented a potential clash; most notably in terms of the route by which any future declarations about the surrender of the Axis powers and the post-war world might be settled upon. The group recognized that, in terms of resources and population alone, the United Kingdom would struggle to lay claim to a seat at the 'top table'. Its association was as a result of war effort, colonial possessions and relationship with the Dominions. It was therefore argued by successive British speakers that it would be best if one voice could be presented. While Massey and Bruce were willing to accept certain merits to the proposal, they would not countenance any suggestion that the Dominions might sacrifice their hard-earned separate nationhood. There was clearly something of an impasse of thinking, and while the commonly expressed sentiment was to hope for some form of compromise, nobody appeared to have any idea as to what this might be or how it might operate. What few anticipated was that the solution would actually come from Canberra and it would not prove a particularly palatable one for the British government.
The Private Anzac Club
It has been highlighted the degree to which 1944 was the year when both Australia and New Zealand made it clear that, while they still believed strongly in the idea of Commonwealth unity, they would no longer blithely accept the British view of the post-war security system.1 The Australian-New Zealand Agreement signed at Canberra in January of that year was certainly the first visible indication of some sense of devolution towards greater