Empire Lost - Andrew Stewart [98]
The British leader was clearly angered at this, telling the DO that there was no reason to wait 'indefinitely' for a response from Ottawa and that the delay should not be allowed, effectively, to veto a meeting of the whole Imperial body.4 But, with no sign of consensus emerging, it was reluctantly decided to again, at least, temporarily curtail the planning. The eventual decision to hold the meeting in May 1944 can in fact though largely be attributed to Smuts. He told Cranborne that he could not travel any earlier and he thought it would be a more convenient date for his fellow Dominion leaders; also he believed, crucially, that the war would be within a few months of its end, allowing for more relevant talks about the future.5 As a basis for reaching a final consensus this seemed to do the job and proved the culmination of the long-running attempts to settle on a date.6 On this basis the British political class could now become more fully involved. Cranborne had first asked at the beginning of January 1944 that he be allowed to submit a short memorandum on the subject to the War Cabinet. A very tentative agenda for a meeting in London involving all of the Dominion prime ministers had first been set out in the summer of 1943; there were at this point two items for discussion, 'short term problems, mainly in Europe' and 'long term problems of world organization'. Inevitably the changing nature of the war had quickly made this redundant, but this gave the DO a start-point with which to sit down and produce a more comprehensive document. The Dominions secretary envisaged that the main subjects for discussion would be the immediate military situation, questions arising from the probable defeat of Germany prior to Japan's capitulation, outlines of the post-war settlement and cooperation within the Commonwealth following the war's end. There would also likely be special subjects such as colonial policy, migration and civil aviation. He did not want any 'elaborate preparation of documents', but felt that there would be advantages in giving certain material in advance to the Dominion leaders, noting that Smuts had asked that this might be done.7 With the desire being to stress that it was not an Imperial Conference, Cranborne was keen that the South Rhodesian prime minister should not be invited and the Indian representative in the War Cabinet should only attend if there were any special subjects affecting India.8
This departmental study resulted in a Cabinet paper that was discussed at an evening meeting of the War Cabinet held later that month, although it was actually a much shortened and more general document than had been prepared by the Whitehall officials. Churchill concluded the very brief discussion with the comment 'we should be at pains to make it clear that the note of the meeting was to be an effort to establish still more strongly, closely and recognizably the unity of the structure of the Commonwealth and the Empire'.9 Privately he had let it be known among his senior colleagues in Westminster that the agenda for the meeting was to be reduced to a minimum. The senior official in the FO responsible for Dominion affairs recorded that he understood Churchill did not contemplate a series of formal meetings and that any agenda, if one was even prepared, would be extremely restricted.10 It was proposed that a Ministerial Committee be formed, headed by Cranborne, whose aim would be to scope out the parameters of the proposed conference, who would be attending, the