Everything Is Obvious_ _Once You Know the Answer - Duncan J. Watts [111]
Rather than questing after grand theories or universal laws of human behavior, therefore, Merton instead advocated that sociologists should focus on developing “theories of the middle range,” meaning theories that are broad enough to account for more than isolated phenomena but specific enough to say something concrete and useful. For example, the “theory of relative deprivation” states that people feel distressed by circumstances only inasmuch as their hardship exceeds that of the people around them. Thus if your house burns down in a freak fire, you’re devastated, but if your whole city is wiped out in an earthquake and hundreds of your neighbors die, you feel lucky to be alive. It’s not a completely general theory, claiming only to predict how people respond to adversity, but it also aims to apply to perceptions of adversity quite broadly. Likewise, the “theory of the role set” stresses that each individual plays not only multiple roles—a teacher at school, a father at home, a catcher on the weekend softball team—but also that each of these roles is itself a collection of relationships: between a teacher and his students, between him and his colleagues, and between him and his principal. Again, the theory is somewhat specific—saying nothing about markets or governments, or other important features of the social world—but also somewhat general, applying to people of all kinds.6
Merton’s call for middle-range theories is generally regarded as sensible, but it didn’t quell the ardor for theories of a grander nature. Barely a year after Merton published his critique, in fact, the economist John Harsanyi, who shared the 1994 Nobel memorial Prize in Economics for his work on game theory, proposed that rational choice theory—the theory of human decision making that I discussed in Chapter 2—was ready to provide precisely the kind of general theory that Merton has just concluded was wildly premature. And so another cycle began, with rational choice theorists drawing parallels between their efforts and Newtonian mechanics, while critics increasingly leveled the same complaints against it that the rational choice theorists themselves had made about the previous round of theories like Parsons’s.7 Nor has the growing realization that rational choice theory cannot provide a universal theory of human behavior any more than its predecessors could yet delivered social science from the green-eyed monster of physics envy.8 Quite to the contrary, if the complaint of my physicist colleague is anything to go by, even if sociologists have finally gotten tired of grand theories of everything, there is a whole generation of physicists waiting to step into the breach.9
When you think about the sheer complexity of human behavior, this approach to