FDR - Jean Edward Smith [216]
Roosevelt remained at Campobello four days. While there he took advantage of his absence from Washington to launch a torpedo that ultimately sank the World Monetary and Economic Conference meeting in London. At the behest of Britain and France, with reluctant U.S. support, representatives of sixty-six nations had convened in the British capital on June 20 to stabilize world currencies. FDR had studied and reflected on the matter during his cruise northward and by the time he arrived at Campobello had concluded that it was not in America’s interest to stabilize the dollar. It would be preferable for the U.S. economy to allow the dollar to float.
On the afternoon of June 30 FDR invited the newsmen who had accompanied him for a buffet lunch at the family cottage. After lunch and a few hands of bridge, the president pushed back his wheelchair and said, “I think it might be more interesting to talk for a while.” According to Charles Hurd of The New York Times, FDR “looked at his watch, and added, ‘You’ll want to go back to your dock with the tide, which gives us about an hour.’ (We were amazed that Roosevelt, then probably the busiest man in the world, could take time to keep up with the tide variations in Campobello.)”
FDR ranged over a variety of topics but soon focused on the London conference. “Etiquette forbade us to take notes,” Hurd said. “We listened.” Roosevelt made clear that while he was much in favor of international accommodation, “the United States was not going to be pushed around.” He would not agree to any pegging of the dollar that would benefit foreign countries at American expense. The newsmen—all hardened veterans who had covered the White House for years—were stunned.
“Is that for publication, Mr. President?” asked one reporter.
“No, it is off the record.… Of course, if you were simply discussing this on your own, would you not possibly reach the same conclusion?”
“Mr. President, you know very well that no one cares a whit what we think; we don’t make the policy.”
“Well, how you handle anything you write is up to you,” said FDR. “But isn’t a Campobello dateline a pretty good hedge?”32
The following day, July 1, 1933, The New York Times broke Hurd’s story on page one. Diplomatic notes dribbled back and forth across the Atlantic for the next two weeks, but for all practical purposes the London conference was dead. Raymond Moley, who had been appointed assistant secretary of state and who ramrodded American efforts in London, felt undercut by FDR and soon resigned from the administration. Secretary of State Hull, always uncomfortable with Moley as assistant secretary, shed no tear, and Roosevelt never had a second thought about torpedoing the conference. “I’m prouder of that than anything I ever did,” he told Arthur Krock in 1937.33
An equally serious foreign policy issue involved diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. In 1933, the United States was the only major power that had not established formal relations with Moscow. The USSR had been a full participant in the London Economic Conference, it had become a vigorous trading partner for the nations of Europe, and it was abundantly clear that the Soviet regime would remain the government of Russia for the foreseeable future.
Under the Constitution the power of diplomatic recognition is entrusted exclusively to the president.* And by the fall of 1933 Roosevelt had come to the conclusion that continued nonrecognition served no useful purpose. The furor of 1920s anti-Bolshevism had subsided, American business looked favorably on increasing trade, and the traditional rivalry between Russia and Japan in the Far East made the Soviet Union a reliable buffer against Japanese expansionism. A survey of 1,139 newspapers in September indicated that fewer than 27 percent opposed recognition.