FDR - Jean Edward Smith [246]
* The Judges Bill of 1925, enacted on the recommendation of Chief Justice Taft, gave the Supreme Court almost complete control of its docket. A litigant who wished to appeal to the Court filed a request for a writ of certiorari—a discretionary writ—to allow the case to come forward. Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court states, “A review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor.” It requires the agreement of four justices for the writ to be issued. When the Court denies the writ, as it did in 87 percent of the cases in 1936–37, it customarily does not state the reason why.
* Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (Stone for the Court), upholding the National Firearms Act; Wright v. Vinton, 300 U.S. 440 (Brandeis), sustaining a revised version of the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act; and Virginia Railway Co. v. Federation, 300 U.S. 515 (Stone), upholding the collective bargaining provisions of the Railway Labor Act.
EIGHTEEN
LOW TIDE
Nothing is ever gained by trying to seek revenge in politics.
—JAMES A. FARLEY
FDR OVERPLAYED HIS HAND. To attack the Court was wrongheaded. To persist after the cause was won was petulant. Roosevelt paid dearly. Not only did he squander public support, but the Court fracas ruptured the Democratic party. Conservative Democrats and Republicans who made common cause to thwart FDR’s Court-packing plan found it easy to work together against other White House initiatives. The New Deal ceased to be a synonym for the Democratic party. From 1937 on, it was merely a movement within the party. Not all southerners were conservative, and not all conservative Democrats were from the South. But there were enough to give the anti–New Deal coalition a Dixie twang.
FDR’s legislative program was the first casualty. “Must” bills considered certain of passage at inauguration encountered heavy opposition. When the Court plan was defeated in July, five administration measures awaited action: wages and hours legislation, low-cost housing, reorganization of the executive branch, a revised farm program, and the creation of seven additional TVA-type regional authorities. When Congress adjourned at the end of August, only the Wagner Housing Bill had been enacted—a tribute more to Senator Wagner’s legislative skill than to White House support. Roosevelt recalled Congress into special session in November with a demand that action be taken, but the session proved a disaster. Despite unprecedented Democratic majorities in both Houses, not one additional piece of legislation was enacted. Only a year after his overwhelming election victory, FDR had lost control of the party.*
Roosevelt stubbed his toe when Senate Democrats chose a leader to replace the revered Joe Robinson. The candidates were Mississippi’s Pat Harrison, chairman of the Finance Committee, and Alben Barkley of Kentucky, the assistant leader. Harrison was a fixture in Mississippi’s Democratic establishment, Barkley in the populist ranks of Kentucky. On policy issues there was little daylight separating the two. Both backed the New Deal, and both had supported FDR in the Court fight. Both had been for Roosevelt before Chicago. Barkley had given the keynote addresses at the 1932 and 1936 conventions; Harrison had given the keynote in 1924 and played a vital role keeping Mississippi in Roosevelt’s column on the crucial third ballot at Chicago in 1932. Harrison, one of the Senate’s Big Four, was considered a shoo-in.1† Roosevelt promised not to intervene, as did party chairman Farley and Vice President Garner.2
As the senators prepared to vote, Roosevelt changed his mind. He liked Barkley more than Harrison and believed he would be easier to work with. “My dear Alben,” the president wrote in a lengthy letter the White House released, making clear where his sympathies lay.3 FDR used all the power at his disposal to influence the outcome. He placed