FDR - Jean Edward Smith [350]
Roosevelt was sympathetic. Before Molotov arrived, the president had sent a memo to Marshall and King noting that “Our principal objective is to help Russia.… Russian armies are killing more Germans and destroying more Axis materiel than all 25 United Nations put together.”57 He turned Molotov’s question over to General Marshall. “Are developments clear enough so that we could say to Mr. Stalin that we are preparing a second front?” asked the president.
When Marshall said “Yes,” Roosevelt authorized Molotov to tell Stalin that “we expect the formation of a second front this year.”58 Roosevelt repeated the promise the following day. But at the urging of Marshall and King, who were uneasy about being tied to a precise time, he added that in order to build up materiel for opening a second front, the United States would have to cut back Lend-Lease supplies to Russia. Molotov bristled. What would happen if the Soviet Union agreed to cut its Lend-Lease requirements and no second front developed?
“You cannot have your cake and eat it too,” FDR replied. “Ships cannot be in two places at once. Every ship we shift to the English run means that the second front is so much closer to being realized.” Roosevelt then repeated his pledge for a second front in 1942, and Molotov agreed to advise Moscow of the reduction in aid shipments.*
On June 11, 1942, with FDR in Hyde Park and Molotov back in the Soviet Union, Washington and Moscow released a joint statement acknowledging the discussions. “In the course of the conversations full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942.” General Marshall had objected to any specific reference to 1942, but Roosevelt overruled him. The president was concerned about public reaction to Molotov’s visit and wanted to strike a positive note. As with the ambitious production targets he had announced earlier, Roosevelt recognized the need to set goals that would keep the nation moving. He also hoped to solidify the coalition. “I am especially anxious that he [Molotov] carry back some real results of his Mission, and that he will give a favorable account to Stalin,” Roosevelt wrote Churchill. “I was greatly pleased with the visit. He warmed up far more than I expected and I am sure he has a far better understanding of the situation than when he arrived.”59
Washington’s announcement of a second front in 1942 energized Churchill. The last thing the British government wanted was a premature cross-Channel attack. The enormous battlefield losses of World War I, Churchill’s own unfortunate experience with the amphibious landing at Gallipoli in 1915, and an awareness of how ill prepared and unready the Western Allies, particularly the United States, were to take on the Wehrmacht made London doubly cautious about launching an invasion of the Continent.
Scarcely before the ink had dried on the Washington-Moscow communiqué, Churchill was in Hyde Park, determined to dissuade Roosevelt. The bumpy plane ride from Washington and the even bumpier landing at tiny New Hackensack airport disconcerted Churchill, but not nearly so much as careening around the Roosevelt estate in the president’s made-over Ford convertible with FDR behind the steering wheel. “I confess that when on several occasions the car poised and backed on the grass verges of the precipices over the Hudson I hoped the mechanical devices [by which Roosevelt drove] and brakes would show no defects,” he wrote.60 As at the White House, Churchill made himself at home, walking barefoot, going wherever he chose, whenever he chose.