FDR - Jean Edward Smith [352]
Once Roosevelt unequivocally ordered the invasion of North Africa [now code-named TORCH], Marshall and King gave it their complete support. Marshall organized the Army’s part of the operation with his usual tenacity, and King set aside his customary Anglophobia. “We are embarked on a risky undertaking,” Stimson confided to his diary on September 17, 1942, “but it is not at all hopeless and, the Commander in Chief having made the decision, we must do our best to make it a success.”70 To lead the invasion Churchill diplomatically suggested an American be named, and General Marshall chose Dwight D. Eisenhower, Marshall’s former deputy for war plans, who was in England planning the cross-Channel attack.71
Roosevelt’s biggest problem was breaking the news to Stalin. The Russians had already invited Churchill to Moscow, and FDR chose to let the prime minister explain the change of plans. “It is essential for us to bear in mind our Ally’s personality and the very difficult and dangerous situation he confronts,” Roosevelt cabled Churchill. “I think we should attempt to put ourselves in his place, for no one whose country has been invaded can be expected to approach the war from a global point of view.”72
Churchill met with Stalin in the Kremlin for five lengthy sessions between the thirteenth of August and the early morning hours of the sixteenth. The Soviets followed their customary negotiating strategy: rigid intransigence sandwiched between an exceptionally cordial welcome and an uproariously celebratory good-bye.* Stalin said he regretted the Allies’ decision but acknowledged that it was not his to make. To Churchill’s surprise he instantly saw the advantages of a North African attack. “It would hit Rommel in the back. It would over awe Spain. It would produce fighting between Germans and Frenchmen … and it would expose Italy to the whole brunt of the war.”73 Churchill told Roosevelt the meetings had gone well. “I am sure that the disappointing news I brought could not have been imparted except by me personally without leading to really serious drifting apart. Now they know the worst, and having made their protest are entirely friendly. Moreover, Monsieur Stalin is entirely convinced of the great advantages of TORCH.”74
Planning for TORCH led to considerable toing and froing between the American and British chiefs of staff that Churchill and Roosevelt ultimately had to resolve. The British wanted to land on the Mediterranean coast of Africa, as far east as possible. That would provide instant support for Montgomery’s beleaguered Eighth Army in Egypt. General Marshall, on the other hand, insisted on landing on the Atlantic (west) coast of Morocco. Marshall worried that a landing inside the Mediterranean would require passage through the Strait of Gibraltar. “A single line of communication through the Straits is far too hazardous,” he told FDR.75 Churchill thought Marshall’s caution misplaced. Spain was not going to war because of TORCH, he told Roosevelt, and it would take at least two months for Germany to work its way through Spain to Gibraltar. It was essential, said Churchill, to land on the Mediterranean coast. “If TORCH collapses or is cut down as is now proposed, I should feel my position painfully affected.”76
Roosevelt was sympathetic. Churchill had convinced Stalin of the importance of TORCH, and the president did not wish to leave him in the lurch. He rejected a harsh reply drafted by General Marshall and suggested instead that simultaneous landings be considered.77 The president and Churchill exchanged several more cables—“we are getting very close together,” said FDR on September 4—and eventually a compromise was reached. The United States offered to reduce the size of its landing at Casablanca and provide additional support for the British to land near Algiers. “I am directing all preparation to proceed,” Roosevelt told Churchill. “We should settle this thing with finality at