FDR - Jean Edward Smith [371]
Stalin replied that he now understood the president’s dilemma and would not complicate the problem for him. Later he told Churchill that he earnestly wanted Roosevelt reelected and believed it would be much to the world’s advantage if he were.84 FDR’s mention of the 1944 election to Stalin at Teheran is the first indication the president gave that he might seek a fourth term.
Roosevelt also alluded to the Baltic states. There were a number of people in the United States of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian origin. The United States was not going to war with the Soviet Union to protect the independence of the three Baltic states, he joked, but he hoped Stalin would permit some type of plebiscite to express the will of the people. The right of self-determination was a moral issue for most Americans. Stalin said there would be abundant opportunity under the Soviet constitution for the Baltic people to express themselves. Roosevelt replied that it would be very helpful to him personally if some public declaration of future elections could be made.85
The principal issue at Teheran was the second front. At the first plenary session of the Big Three, Stalin, in an almost matter-of-fact tone, confirmed that Russia would join the war against Japan once Germany was defeated. Soviet forces in Siberia would be reinforced and then take the offensive.86 This was a significant Russian commitment and drastically reduced the importance of China to the Pacific war effort.87 But the Soviet Union expected a quid pro quo. When were the Allies going to land in France?
Roosevelt believed that at Quebec he had received Churchill’s absolute assurance for a cross-Channel invasion no later than May 1, 1944. But Churchill evidently had reservations. Employing his vast reservoir of rhetoric, the prime minister dissembled. He spoke at length about the virtues of alternative approaches—Italy, Turkey, the island of Rhodes, the Balkans—and the shortage of landing craft for an invasion of France.
Stalin replied bluntly. From the Russian point of view Turkey, Rhodes, Yugoslavia, and even the capture of Rome were irrelevant. “If we are here to discuss military matters, Russia is only interested in OVERLORD.”88 Roosevelt came down hard on Stalin’s side. “We are all agreed that OVERLORD is the dominating operation, and that any operation which might delay OVERLORD cannot be considered by us.”89 The president said he favored sticking to the original date set at Quebec, namely the first part of May.90
For all practical purposes the issue was settled. As Hopkins recalled, Stalin looked at Churchill as if to say, “Well, what about that?”91 He then pressed on: “I do not care if it is the 1st of May, or the 15th, or the 20th. But a definite date is important.”
He turned to Roosevelt. “Who will command OVERLORD?” The president was caught off guard.* It was widely assumed that General Marshall would be named, but FDR apparently had second thoughts. He told Stalin no decision had been made. “Then nothing will come out of these operations,” said Stalin. The Soviet Union had learned that in military matters decisions could not be made by committee. “One man must be responsible and one man must make decisions.”92
Churchill fought a rearguard action. The Mediterranean ought not be neglected. Once again he argued the case from every conceivable angle. Stalin allowed that such operations might have value but were diversions. “Do the British really believe in OVERLORD or are they only saying so to make us feel better?”93
Churchill glowered, chomped on his cigar, and suggested