FDR - Jean Edward Smith [394]
On the other hand, the American delegation saw no problem. Edward R. Stettinius, who had succeeded Hull as secretary of state in December, thought Roosevelt had recovered significantly since the inauguration and appeared to be “cheerful, calm, and quite rested.”141 Leahy felt the president conducted the meetings with great skill. “His personality dominated the discussions. He looked fatigued when we left, but so did we all.”142 Charles Bohlen, again serving as FDR’s translator, saw no loss in the president’s acumen at Yalta: “While his physical state was not up to normal, his mental and psychological state was certainly not affected. Our leader was ill, but he was effective.”143 Harriman said Roosevelt carried on the negotiations “with his usual skill and perception.”144 Dr. Bruenn, who was best placed to observe, told Anna the president had a “serious ticker situation” but did not appear overly concerned.145 In his notes Bruenn recorded that throughout the conference, with one exception, Roosevelt’s blood pressure and electrocardiogram remained unchanged.* “His mood was excellent. His appetite was excellent, and he appeared to enjoy Russian food and cooking.”146
The Big Three met eight times in eight days, usually for three to four hours. As had become customary, FDR presided. Additional discussions took place over lunch and dinner. The conference began with a review of the military situation. On the eastern front, Red Army troops had taken Warsaw, enveloped Budapest, driven the Germans out of Yugoslavia, occupied East Prussia, and were poised on the Oder, fifty miles from Berlin. In the West, the Allies had recovered from the Battle of the Bulge, expelled Nazi forces from Belgium, cracked the Siegfried Line, and were closing on the Rhine. Slowly the war in Europe was winding down.
The conference reached quick agreement on the occupation of Germany. The country would not be dismembered (as had been suggested at Teheran), and France would be added as an occupying power. The divisive issue of reparations was papered over. It was agreed to take the figure of $20 billion as a basis of discussion, with the Russians entitled to 50 percent, but the matter was referred to a tripartite commission for final action. Arrangements for the trial of major war criminals was handed off to the three foreign ministers. In a major breakthrough, Stalin accepted FDR’s proposal for voting procedures on the United Nations Security Council.147 Each member of the Council would have one vote, but all major decisions would require the unanimous agreement of the permanent members. The Soviets also agreed to Roosevelt’s suggestion that a conference to organize the United Nations convene shortly in San Francisco.
The issue of postwar Poland proved the most contentious, although, as Harriman observed, “events were in the saddle.” The Red Army occupied the entire country and had already installed a pro-Soviet government in Warsaw. “It would have taken a great deal more leverage than Roosevelt and Churchill in fact possessed,” Harriman observed, “in order to alter the situation fundamentally.”148 Stalin wanted a Communist Poland for security reasons. “It was a matter of life and death.”149 Roosevelt wanted face-saving cover to protect his standing among Polish Americans. The result was the Declaration on Liberated Europe. It pledged free elections in liberated countries and governments that were “broadly representative of all democratic elements.”150 The formula was so elastic, Leahy complained to FDR,