Fortune's rocks_ a novel - Anita Shreve [151]
Sears slowly turns and looks directly at Olympia. Despite her desire to remain calm, her cheeks burn, as though proving Sears correct in his accusations. He then abruptly turns his back on Olympia, suggesting that he cannot even bear to look at her.
“Your Honor, the courts of this land have consistently decided that if a child is left with an immoral mother, then that child is in danger of becoming immoral himself. Unwed mothers have, in nearly all cases brought before the courts, been denied not only custody but also visitation rights.
“Olympia Biddeford has shown no interest in the child’s welfare,” Sears continues. “She abandoned the boy on the day of his birth, never inquired as to his whereabouts, never contributed a penny to his care, never knew where he was until last fall. Moreover, she has never even met with or spoken to the child. According to the law of the land, a mother who abandons her child, who lets this child remain too long with a surrogate family, loses her custodial rights and legal standing. As there are no other cases on point with written decisions in the state of New Hampshire, making the case before us today one of first impression, I should like to make reference to other cases stated in the respondents’ memorandum. If I may refer to the 1888 decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court in Hoxie v. Potter: ‘The courts do not feel called upon to sunder the ties that have been permitted to grow up, and believe that the happiness of the boy and the rights and feelings of his foster parents will be best subserved by leaving custody where it now is.’”
Olympia glances at Tucker, who is staring at his notes in front of him.
“Olympia Biddeford may be a mother by nature, but she is not by nurture,” Sears pronounces. “And even if she were a morally upright woman, which she clearly is not, she would have to be considered an unfit guardian on the basis of her age at the time of the child’s conception, which was fifteen years, her marital status, which continues to be unwed, and her inability to provide a religious education for the boy. She herself is not a member of any church, nor does she attend services on any regular basis.”
Sears turns quickly and points at Olympia, a gesture so sudden that she flinches.
“Perhaps Olympia Biddeford seeks rehabilitation by having the child restored to her,” the lawyer says, as though the idea were a novel one. “This was once, in fact, a not uncommon if misguided notion of the courts. And I quote now from the 1873 decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court: ‘That if a woman be an unmarried mother, the surrendering of her child removes the one great influence toward a restoration of character through maternal affection. Her love for the child and fear of separation may prove her salvation.’”
Sears looks up at the judge and holds out his hands, palms up. “But, Your Honor, the state of New Hampshire does not care about the rehabilitation of the mother. It must and does care first and foremost about the welfare of the child.”
Olympia presses her own hands tightly together in her lap. But I, too, care about the welfare of the child, she wants to cry out.
“So let us, for the moment, put aside the character of Olympia Biddeford,” Sears continues. “And let us consider only the best interests of the child.”
Now Sears turns and gazes at Albertine and Telesphore Bolduc, who both immediately look down into their laps, as if about to be chastised themselves. The couple appear to be at least as uncomfortable with these proceedings as Olympia is.
“Citing for a moment the New York case of Chapsky v. Wood in 1881,” Sears says, “‘When reclamation is not sought until a lapse of years, when new ties have been formed and a certain current given to the child’s life and thought, much attention should be paid to the unlikelihood of a benefit to the child from the change. It is an obvious fact that ties of blood weaken and ties of companionship strengthen by lapse of time; and the prosperity and welfare of the child depend on the ability to do all which