Founding America (Barnes & Noble Classics) - Jack N. Rakove [118]
I shall now Sir take the Liberty to Suppose, that the Revenues I have mentioned, or some others to the Amount of at least two Millions net annual Produce, were asked for and obtained, as a Pledge to the public Creditors; to continue untill the Principal and Interest of the Debts contracted, or to be contracted, should be finally paid. This Supposition is made that I may have an Opportunity (thus early) to express my Sentiments on the Mode of Appropriation. It would be as follows. Any one of the Revenues, being estimated, a Loan should be opened on the Credit of it, by Subscription, to a certain Amount and public Debts of a particular Description (or Specie) be received in Payment of the Subscriptions. This funded Debt should be transferable, under particular Forms, calculated for the Prevention of fraudulent, and facilitating of honest Negotiations. In like Manner on each of these Revenues should Subscriptions be opened, proceeding by Degrees so as to prevent any sudden Revolutions in Money Matters; such Revolutions being always more or less injurious. I should farther propose, that the Surplus of each of these Revenues (and Care should be taken that there would be a Surplus) should be carried to a Sinking Fund, on the Credit of which, and of the general Promises of Government new Loans should be opened, when necessary. The Interest should be paid half yearly; which would be convenient to the Creditors and to the Government, as well as useful to the People at large: because by this Means, if four different Loans were opened at different Times, the Interest would be payable eight Times in the Year, and thus the Money would be paid out of the Treasury as fast as it came in, which would require fewer Officers to manage the Business, keep them in more constant and regular Employment, dispense the Interest so as to command the Confidence and facilitate the Views of the Creditors, and return speedily the Wealth obtained by Taxes into the Common Stock. I know it will be objected, that such a Mode of Administration would enable Speculators to perform their Operations. A general Answer to this would be, that any other Mode would be more favorable to them. But farther, I conceive, first, that it is much beneath the Dignity of Government to intermeddle in such Considerations. Secondly, that Speculators always do least Mischief where they are left most at Liberty. Thirdly, that it is not in human Prudence to counteract their Operations by Laws; whereas when left alone they invariably counteract each other. And fourthly, that even if it were possible to prevent Speculation, it is precisely the Thing which ought not to be prevented; because he who wants Money to commence, pursue or extend his Business, is more benefited by selling Stock of any Kind (even at a considerable