Founding America (Barnes & Noble Classics) - Jack N. Rakove [185]
Madison’s notes were published only in 1840, four years after his death. He first began editing them in the early 1790s but continued to do so during his long retirement, taking advantage of the publication of the official journal of motions and votes kept, rather sloppily, by William Jackson, the convention’s secretary, and of other notes of debates kept by New York delegate Robert Yates. Following the editorial procedures used by Max Farrand in his definitive edition of The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, the debates reprinted below use square brackets to indicate later insertions to Madison’s notes from the journals and angled brackets to identify later additions or clarifications to the delegates’ speeches.
EDMUND RANDOLPH INTRODUCES
THE VIRGINIA PLAN
MAY 29, 787
MR. RANDOLPH44 [THEN] OPENED the main business.
He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than those, who were of longer standing in life and political experience, to open the great subject of their mission. But, as the convention had originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed, that some proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task on him.
He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfal.
He observed that in revising the fœderal system we ought to inquire 1. into the properties, which such a government ought to possess, 2. the defects of the confederation, 3. the danger of our situation &. 4. the remedy.
1. The character of such a governme[nt] ought to secure 1. against foreign invasion: 2. against dissentions between members of the Union, or seditions in particular states: 3. to p[ro]cure to the several States various blessings, of which an isolated situation was i[n]capable: 4. to be able to defend itself against incroachment: & 5. to be paramount to the state constitutions.
2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high respect for its authors, and considered, them as having done all that patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions, & of confederacies,—when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown—no commercial discord had arisen among any states—no rebellion had appeared as in Massts.—foreign debts had not become urgent—the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen—treaties had not been violated—and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.
He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: 1. that the confederation produced no security agai[nst] foreign invasion; congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by th[eir] own authority—Of this he cited many examples; most of whi[ch] tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished: that particular states might by their conduct provoke war without controul; and that neither militia nor draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be successful, and these could not be executed without money.
2. that the fœderal government could not check the quarrals between states, nor a rebellion in any not having constitutional power Nor means to interpose according to the exigency:
3. that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation—such as a productive impost—counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum—&c &c.
4. that the fœderal government could not defend itself against the incroachments from the states:
5. that it was not even paramount to the state