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On what principle does the voice of the majority bind the minority ? It does not result I conceive from the law of nature, but from compact founded on conveniency. A greater proportion might be required by the fundamental constitution of a Society if it were judged eligible. Prior then to the establishment of this principle, unanimity was necessary; and strict Theory at all times presupposes the assent of every member to the establishment of the rule itself. If this assent can not be given tacitly, or be not implied where no positive evidence forbids, persons born in Society would not on attaining ripe age be bound by acts of the Majority; and either a unanimous repetition of every law would be necessary on the accession of new members, or an express assent must be obtained from these to the rule by which the voice of the Majority is made the voice of the whole.

If the observations I have hazarded be not misapplied, it follows that a limitation of the validity of national acts to the computed life of a nation, is in some instances not required by Theory, and in others cannot be accomodated to practice. The observations are not meant however to impeach either the utility of the principle in some particular cases; or the general importance of it in the eye of the philosophical Legislator. On the contrary it would give me singular pleasure to see it first announced in the proceedings of the U. States, and always kept in their view, as a salutary curb on the living generation from imposing unjust or unnecessary burdens on their successors. But this is a pleasure which I have little hope of enjoying. The spirit of philosophical legislation has never reached some parts of the Union, and is by no means the fashion here, either within or without Congress. The evils suffered and feared from weakness in Government, and licentiousness in the people, have turned the attention more towards the means of strengthening the former than of narrowing its extent in the minds of the latter. Besides this, it is so much easier to espy the little difficulties immediately incident to every great plan, than to comprehend its general and remote benefits, that our hemisphere must be still more enlightened before many of the sublime truths which are seen thro’ the medium of Philosophy, become visible to the naked eye of the ordinary Politician. I have nothing to add at present but that I remain always and most af fectly. Yours,

JS. MADISON JR.

PROPOSING AMENDMENTS

Massachusetts Ratification Convention (February 6, 1788)

PAGE 591

Virginia Ratification Convention (June 27, 1788)

PAGE 594

New York Ratification Convention (July 26, 1788)

PAGE 600

IN RATIFICATION CONVENTIONS WHERE they enjoyed decided majorities, Federalists felt little inclination to placate their opponents, and insisted that the Constitution be ratified as proposed. In states where the sides were more evenly balanced, like Massachusetts, or where Anti-Federalists had potential or real majorities, like Virginia and New York, the Constitution’s supporters had to act more prudently. Here they adopted a twofold strategy. On the one hand, they still insisted that the Constitution had to be ratified now, in its entirety, without prior conditions to be satisfied before a state’s assent would be conclusive. But on the other hand, if those conditions were met, Federalists indicated they would acquiesce in recommending amendments for future consideration, presumably by the first Congress to meet under the new Constitution. In the three populous and critical states just mentioned, this formula became the basis for securing ratification.

Many scholars have argued that this process produced an effective promise by Federalists to make sure that articles like the eventual Bill of Rights would be added to the Constitution. The decision to recommend amendments thus became another compromise, like those that affected the rules of representation in the new Congress. Federalists, however, did not see it quite the same way. Their main goal was to make