Harmony and Conflict in the Living World - Alexander F. Skutch [65]
Teleology
The second frequently condemned heresy is teleology, the doctrine that natural processes are directed toward ends, that nature is pervaded by purpose. Since we humans are so purposeful, we spontaneously ascribe purpose to the animals around us, and often to nature as a whole. Thus, teleology might be considered an aspect of anthropomorphism, the ascription of human qualities to nonhuman things. The teleological thought of early humans was firmly incorporated in religions that thrive to this day and was accepted by Classical philosophers. Aristotle (Physics, bk. 2, ch. 3) recognized four categories of causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. The first, or material, cause is the matter of which anything is made. The second, or formal, cause is the archetype or the form that it will assume. The third, or efficient, cause is the mover, or agent, that shapes the material into form. The final cause is the end for which the object is created, the goal toward which a movement is directed. To take one of the examples that Aristotle gives, the material cause of a bowl is the silver of which it is made. Its formal cause is its design, perhaps an image in the silversmith's mind, or a model that he copies. The efficient cause is the smith himself, who hammers it out with arms and hands. The final cause is the finished product, or the use for which it is intended. In general, the final cause is the end, for the sake of which something is made or done, as health is the end of the physician's art.
A complex artifact may have multiple causes: a variety of materials may enter into its construction; different components may be planned by different designers; many workers may be needed to make its parts and assemble them; if it can serve in diverse ways, it may be said to have several final causes in the Aristotelian sense.
Only efficient causes can accomplish ends. Unless it find means, a purpose is as helpless as a hatchling sparrow. To be effective, a
Page 135
final cause must find adequate material and efficient causes. An end capable of fulfillment becomes a selector of causes, itself a cause of the second order.
Modern technology is, of course, deeply concerned with final causesthe uses to which its inventions can be put, the profits they will bring to their manufacturers. Pure science concentrates upon the first two causes: matter and the forces that move or shape it. A form is viewed not as a cause but as a result of the action of forces upon matter. Final causes, ends for the sake of which things happen or are done, are commonly viewed as beyond the purview of science. This is true even in biology, which deals with the living world, where, if anywhere, we are inclined to look for purposes. Organs and tissues appear to be formed to serve definite ends; animals appear to act with a purpose. Since we are such purposeful, goal-oriented bipeds, our language is so rich in teleological expressions that young students in a biological laboratory do well to be careful how they use it. They will be safer from rebuke by a meticulous professor if they speak of the function rather than the purpose of an organ. The harmless little preposition ''to" has teleological implications: we study to learn; we work to earn money. To avoid so much as a suspicion of this heresy, the student should say, "The plant grows upward and spreads its leaves in the sunshine," not "in order to spread its leaves. . . ."
A major concern of contemporary biologists is evolution. I infer from the titles of many papers that their authors believe it more important to know how an animal evolved (usually a speculative question) than how it lives and acts (which often can be learned by patient observation). In discussions of evolutionwhich to the naive onlooker sometimes appears to be directed toward endspurpose, design, or goal are strictly taboo; only material and