History of Friedrich II of Prussia V 11 [69]
himself, whose veracity is
unquestionable to such as know anything of him:--
"This Silesian Project fulfilled all his (the King's) political
views,"--summed them all well up into one head. "It was a means of
acquiriug reputation; of increasing the power of the State; and of
terminating what concerned that long-litigated question of the
Berg-Julich Succession;"--can be sure of getting that, at lowest;
intends to give that up, if necessary.
"Meanwhile, before entirely determining, the King weighed the
risks there were in undertaking such a War, and the advantages
that were to be hoped from it. On one side, presented itself the
potent House of Austria, not likely to want resources with so many
vast Provinces under it; an Emperor's Daughter attacked, who would
naturally find allies in the King of England, in the Dutch
Republic, and so many Princes of the Empire who had signed the
Pragmatic Sanction." Russia was--or had been, and might again be--
in the pay of Vienna. Saxony might have some clippings from
Bohemia thrown to it, and so be gained over. Scanty Harvest, 1740,
threatened difficulties as to provisioning of troops. "The risks
were great. One had to apprehend the vicissitudes of war. A single
battle lost might be decisive. The King had no allies; and his
troops, hitherto without experience, would have to front old
Austrian soldiers, grown gray in harness, and trained to war by so
many campaigns.
"On the other side were hopeful considerations,"--four in number:
FIRST, Weak condition of the Austrian Court, Treasury empty, War-
Apparatus broken in pieces; inexperienced young Princess to defend
a disputed succession, on those terms. SECOND, There WILL be
allies; France and England always in rivalry, both meddling in
these matters, King is sure to get either the one or the other.--
THIRD, Silesian War lies handy to us, and is the only kind of
Offensive War that does; Country bordering on our frontier, and
with the Oder running through it as a sure high-road for
everything. FOURTH, "What suddenly turned the balance," or at
least what kept it steady in that posture,--"news of the Czarina's
death arrives:" Russia has ceased to count against us; and become
a manageable quantity. On, therefore!--
"Add to these reasons," says the King, with a candor which has not
been well treated in the History Books, "Add to these reasons, an
Army ready for acting; Funds, Supplies all found [lying barrelled
in the Schloss at Berlin];--and perhaps the desire of making
oneself a name," from which few of mortals able to achieve it are
exempt in their young time: "all this was cause of the War which
the King now entered upon." [ OEuvres de Frederic italic> (Histoire de mon Temps), i. 128.]
"Desire to make himself a name; how shocking!" exclaim several
Historians. "Candor of confession that he may have had some such
desire; how honest!" is what they do not exclaim. As to the
justice of his Silesian Claims, or even to his own belief about
their justice, Friedrich affords not the least light which can be
new to readers here. He speaks, when business requires it, of
"those known rights" of his, and with the air of a man who expects
to be believed on his word; but it is cursorily, and in the
business way only; and there is not here or elsewhere the least
pleading:--a man, you would say, considerably indifferent to our
belief on that head; his eyes set on the practical merely.
"Just Rights? What are rights, never so just, which you cannot
make valid? The world is full of such. If you have rights and can
assert them into facts, do it; that is worth doing!"--
We must add two Notes, two small absinthine drops, bitter but
wholesome, administered by him to the Old Dessauer, whose gloomy
wonder over all this military whirl of Prussian things, and
discontent that he, lately the head authority, has never once been
spoken to on it, have been great. Guessing, at last, that it was
meant for Austria, a Power rather dear to Leopold, he can suppress
himself no longer; but breaks
unquestionable to such as know anything of him:--
"This Silesian Project fulfilled all his (the King's) political
views,"--summed them all well up into one head. "It was a means of
acquiriug reputation; of increasing the power of the State; and of
terminating what concerned that long-litigated question of the
Berg-Julich Succession;"--can be sure of getting that, at lowest;
intends to give that up, if necessary.
"Meanwhile, before entirely determining, the King weighed the
risks there were in undertaking such a War, and the advantages
that were to be hoped from it. On one side, presented itself the
potent House of Austria, not likely to want resources with so many
vast Provinces under it; an Emperor's Daughter attacked, who would
naturally find allies in the King of England, in the Dutch
Republic, and so many Princes of the Empire who had signed the
Pragmatic Sanction." Russia was--or had been, and might again be--
in the pay of Vienna. Saxony might have some clippings from
Bohemia thrown to it, and so be gained over. Scanty Harvest, 1740,
threatened difficulties as to provisioning of troops. "The risks
were great. One had to apprehend the vicissitudes of war. A single
battle lost might be decisive. The King had no allies; and his
troops, hitherto without experience, would have to front old
Austrian soldiers, grown gray in harness, and trained to war by so
many campaigns.
"On the other side were hopeful considerations,"--four in number:
FIRST, Weak condition of the Austrian Court, Treasury empty, War-
Apparatus broken in pieces; inexperienced young Princess to defend
a disputed succession, on those terms. SECOND, There WILL be
allies; France and England always in rivalry, both meddling in
these matters, King is sure to get either the one or the other.--
THIRD, Silesian War lies handy to us, and is the only kind of
Offensive War that does; Country bordering on our frontier, and
with the Oder running through it as a sure high-road for
everything. FOURTH, "What suddenly turned the balance," or at
least what kept it steady in that posture,--"news of the Czarina's
death arrives:" Russia has ceased to count against us; and become
a manageable quantity. On, therefore!--
"Add to these reasons," says the King, with a candor which has not
been well treated in the History Books, "Add to these reasons, an
Army ready for acting; Funds, Supplies all found [lying barrelled
in the Schloss at Berlin];--and perhaps the desire of making
oneself a name," from which few of mortals able to achieve it are
exempt in their young time: "all this was cause of the War which
the King now entered upon." [
"Desire to make himself a name; how shocking!" exclaim several
Historians. "Candor of confession that he may have had some such
desire; how honest!" is what they do not exclaim. As to the
justice of his Silesian Claims, or even to his own belief about
their justice, Friedrich affords not the least light which can be
new to readers here. He speaks, when business requires it, of
"those known rights" of his, and with the air of a man who expects
to be believed on his word; but it is cursorily, and in the
business way only; and there is not here or elsewhere the least
pleading:--a man, you would say, considerably indifferent to our
belief on that head; his eyes set on the practical merely.
"Just Rights? What are rights, never so just, which you cannot
make valid? The world is full of such. If you have rights and can
assert them into facts, do it; that is worth doing!"--
We must add two Notes, two small absinthine drops, bitter but
wholesome, administered by him to the Old Dessauer, whose gloomy
wonder over all this military whirl of Prussian things, and
discontent that he, lately the head authority, has never once been
spoken to on it, have been great. Guessing, at last, that it was
meant for Austria, a Power rather dear to Leopold, he can suppress
himself no longer; but breaks