History of Western Philosophy - Bertrand Russell [270]
Propositions about future contingents, according to Occam, are not yet
either true or false. He makes no attempt to reconcile this view with divine omniscience. Here, as elsewhere, he keeps logic free from metaphysics and theology.
Some samples of Occam's discussions may be useful.
He asks: 'Whether that which is known by the understanding first according to a primacy of generation is the individual.'
Against: The universal is the first and proper object of the understanding.
For: The object of sense and the object of understanding are the same, but the individual is the first object of sense.
Accordingly, the meaning of the question must be stated. (Presumably, because both arguments seem strong.)
He continues: 'The thing outside the soul which is not a sign is understood first by such knowledge (i.e. by knowledge which is individual), therefore the individual is known first, since everything outside the soul is individual.'
He goes on to say that abstract knowledge always presupposes knowledge which is 'intuitive' (i.e. of perception), and this is caused by individual things.
He then enumerates four doubts which may arise, and proceeds to resolve them.
He concludes with an affirmative answer to his original question, but adds that 'the universal is the first object by primacy of adequation, not by the primacy of generation'.
The question involved is whether, or how far, perception is the source of knowledge. It will be remembered that Plato, in the Theaetetus, rejects the definition of knowledge as perception. Occam, pretty certainly, did not know the Theaetetus, but if he had he would have disagreed with it.
To the question 'whether the sensitive soul and the intellective soul are really distinct in man', he answers that they are, though this is hard to prove. One of his arguments is that we may with our appetites desire something which with our understanding we reject; therefore appetite and understanding belong to different subjects. Another argument is that sensations are subjectively in the sensitive soul, but not subjectively in the intellective soul. Again: the sensitive soul is extended and material, while the intellective soul is neither. Four objections are considered, all theological,6 but they are answered. The view taken by Occam on this question is not, perhaps, what might be expected. However, he agrees with St Thomas and disagrees with Averroes in thinking that each man's intellect is his own, not something impersonal.
By insisting on the possibility of studying logic and human knowledge without reference to metaphysics and theology, Occam's work encouraged
scientific research. The Augustinians, he said, erred in first supposing things unintelligible and men unintelligent, and then adding a light from Infinity by which knowledge became possible. He agreed in this with Aquinas, but differed in emphasis, for Aquinas was primarily a theologian, and Occam was, so far as logic is concerned, primarily a secular philosopher.
His attitude gave confidence to students of particular problems, for instance, his immediate follower Nicholas of Oresme (d. 1382), who investigated planetary theory. This man was, to a certain extent, a precursor of Copernicus; he set forth both the geocentric and the heliocentric theories, and said that each would explain all the facts known in his day, so that there was no way of deciding between them.
After William of Occam there are no