How the States Got Their Shapes Too_ The People Behind the Borderlines - Mark Stein [78]
Mexico saw Britain’s move and, three weeks later, added its chips. On May 7, 1845, its congress passed a resolution. “The unjust usurpation of which [the United States] sought to make Mexico the victim, makes it her duty to take up arms in her defense,” it asserted, upping the ante by concluding, “The Mexican nation calls upon her sons to defend their national independence, threatened by the usurpation of the territory of Texas.”2
It was Polk’s turn again. What he needed now was room to maneuver, knowing he could not simultaneously take on two wars. In July he had Secretary of State James Buchanan make Britain an offer that gave him room to maneuver with U.S. public opinion, and time to do so by making it an offer Britain had to refuse. Polk achieved both with deceptive simplicity. He abandoned his campaign pledge (and inaugural address demand) that the United States was entitled to all of Oregon and returned to the previous administration’s bid for a boundary that continued along the 49th parallel from the Rockies to the Pacific. Americans who preferred compromise to war were startled and impressed; Polk’s militant supporters were startled and upset. Unnoticed by both groups was the absence, in Polk’s proposal, of any mention of British access to the Columbia River. But the British noticed. The Columbia was a major artery of Britain’s fur trade, conducted under the auspices of the Hudson’s Bay Company. In addition, a line from the Rockies to the Pacific would divide Vancouver Island and its prized ports in the strait separating it from the mainland. Britain rejected Polk’s proposal.
In the United States, Britain was now viewed as intractable. What wasn’t viewed was the purpose of Polk’s move—to make Americans view themselves as tractable. Polk had acquired the card he needed.
Later in the same month of July 1845, with Britain now pausing to reassess the U.S. president, Polk raised the stakes on Mexico. He ordered troops to cross the Nueces River, with those orders explicitly stating for the first time that the United States considered the Rio Grande to be the border between Texas and Mexico.
Britain, after considerable thought, opted to match this move. “In a short time,” the London Times reported in November, “Admiral Seymour will be upon or near the coast of Oregon with one ship of 80, one of 50, one of 18, and one of 16 guns.”
Within weeks Polk hedged his bet, sending Congressman John Slidell to Mexico with an offer to purchase Texas for as much as $40 million.3 By hedging on Mexico, Polk caused Britain to ponder him yet again. Did war over Oregon amount to bluffing or not?
To make certain the British kept wondering, Polk used his December 2, 1845, State of the Union message (which he would later make further use of domestically) to ensure the uncertainty of his intentions. In speaking of Oregon, he repeatedly invoked the spirit of compromise while simultaneously raising the specter of war:
In consideration that propositions of compromise had been thrice made by two preceding Administrations … and that the pending negotiation had been commenced on the basis of compromise, I deemed it to be my duty not to abruptly break it off.… A proposition was accordingly made which was rejected by the British.… All attempts at compromise having failed, it becomes the duty of Congress to consider what measures it may be proper to adopt … for the maintenance of our just title to that territory.
Over in Britain, one thing was certain. It too had a militant faction that equated compromise with surrender. This faction was spearheaded by Lord Palmerston, a former foreign minister whose party no longer led Parliament. Prime Minister Robert Peel, like Polk, needed room to maneuver. In a parliamentary maneuver, Peel called Palmerston’s bluff and won. Polk, in response to Peel’s having marginalized Palmerston’s opposition, sent word in January 1846 that if the British wished to make a counterproposal