How We Believe_ Science and the Search for God - Michael Shermer [158]
Duke University philosopher Owen Flanagan would probably answer “yes,” if by soul we mean the pattern of Ted Williams’s memories, personality, and personhood, and if the freezing process did not destroy the neural network in the brain where such entities are stored. But as for some ethereal entity that continues past physical death (whether buried, cremated, or frozen), Flanagan would offer an emphatic “no.” In his latest book, The Problem of the Soul, a courageous and daring look into the heart of what it means to be human, Flanagan builds a bridge between two irreconcilable views of the mind: the humanistic/theological versus the scientific/naturalistic. The former includes a place within our brains for nonphysical mind, free will, and a soul, but fails to offer any tangible proof that such things even exist. The latter is grounded in solid empirical data but fails to show how humans as evolved animals can lead moral and meaningful lives. Flanagan’s purpose is to reconcile the two, and he has done so successfully in this crisply reasoned work. “Can we do without the cluster of concepts that are central to the humanistic image in its present form—the soul and its suite—and still retain some or most of what these concepts were designed to do?” Flanagan’s answer is an emphatic “yes.” To that I add “amen.”
It may simply be that I resonate well with Flanagan because I am a nonbelieving, nontheistic, naturalistic scientist. After a lifetime spent reading the obfuscating works of philosophers and theologians twisting logic into pretzelian contortions to prove such unprovable concepts as God, the soul, and free will, I want to stand up and cheer when I read passages such as this one from Flanagan’s opening salvo: “There is no point beating around the bush. Supernatural concepts have no philosophical warrant. Furthermore, it is not that such concepts are displaced only if we accept, from the start, a naturalistic or scientific visions of things. There