In My Time - Dick Cheney [102]
As the Iraqi representative exited one door, I entered another, and I found a very angry President Mubarak. The Iraqis had lied to him, he said. Just days before the invasion, all the Arab countries had been together for an Arab League summit, and at dinner one night, the Iraqis had made a big show of sitting next to the Kuwaitis, calling them “brother” and promising never to invade.
When I told President Mubarak that the Saudis had agreed to accept the deployment of U.S. troops, he was ready to help. “What do you need?” he asked. I asked him for overflight rights so our planes could fly through Egyptian airspace. He agreed. I told him we also needed permission for one of our nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the U.S.S. Eisenhower, to pass through the Suez Canal. Normally the Egyptians did not like nuclear-powered ships going through the canal and permission could take weeks, but he agreed immediately. “When is it coming?” he asked. “Tonight,” I said. Mubarak also told me he planned to convene an Arab League meeting to discuss the crisis, and he conveyed strong support for U.S. efforts to defend Saudi Arabia. Throughout the crisis King Fahd and President Mubarak would prove to be two of America’s most important allies in the region.
That afternoon I left Egypt and headed for Washington. As my plane rose over the Mediterranean, I got a call on board from President Bush. He had just spoken with King Hassan of Morocco and asked me to stop there on my way home. He wanted me to brief the king on our plans and on my talks with the Saudis and Egyptians. Since the stop was unanticipated, our flight crew had to have landing charts faxed up to the plane.
We landed in Morocco in the middle of the night and took a motorcade to the king’s palace. I asked to see the king one-on-one, which actually meant there were three of us: the king, me, and his interpreter. Hassan asked if the information I wanted to discuss was secret. “Yes,” I told him. “It’s highly classified.” He removed a small box from within the folds of his robes and handed it to his interpreter, who held it in his hands while he and the king exchanged a few words in Arabic. Then the interpreter handed the box back to the king, who put it in a pocket in his robes. The king, who spoke some English, could see I was curious, so he explained to me that his interpreter had just sworn on a fragment of the holy Koran never to divulge the information he was about to hear. I was impressed. It seemed to be a pretty effective classification system—and conveniently portable too.
I told the king that the Saudis had agreed to accept U.S. forces and that President Mubarak was also supportive. I explained that President Bush would be announcing the deployment shortly and wanted King Hassan to know the details of our plans. When I finished, King Hassan told me he was prepared to send Moroccan forces to serve alongside the Americans.
I landed back at Andrews Air Force Base at 3:20 a.m. on Wednesday, August 8, 1990, and after a stop at the Pentagon, I went to the White House for a 7:15 a.m. breakfast meeting with Baker and Scowcroft. At 8:00 a.m., the same hour the first U.S. planes were landing in Saudi Arabia, I went into the Oval Office to brief the president on my trip. At 9:00 a.m., President Bush addressed the nation and announced the deployment of U.S. forces to the desert of Saudi Arabia.
I believe it was in a meeting shortly after the president’s announcement that I fell asleep while seated in the chair next to his in the Cabinet Room—not delicately asleep, but full-on, mouth-open, snoring asleep. Probably because Brent Scowcroft had gotten him used to such behavior by nodding off from time