In My Time - Dick Cheney [110]
This left-hook maneuver would put heavy logistical demands on our troops, as we moved the forces and their equipment hundreds of miles to the west. Our success would depend upon air superiority and on the element of surprise—we had to hope Saddam either would not find out about the plan or wouldn’t believe it if he did.
Satisfied that Norm and his team had done a very solid job putting the plan in place, preparing for contingencies, and getting ready to move, Powell and I left for Washington. On the way home we got word that Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens wanted to meet me—anytime, anywhere. The Israelis had promised us they would not preemptively strike Iraq, but they were understandably nervous about the war planning and wanted to know what to expect.
I was concerned that if I left Saudi Arabia and went directly to a meeting with the Israelis, it would put real pressure on our coalition. It was important that we do everything possible to keep Israel out of the action. We did not want them to become an excuse for Saddam to divide our coalition. Instead of a meeting, we agreed to install a hotline, code-named Hammer Rick, which would connect my office in the Pentagon directly to Israeli Defense Minister Arens.
Back in Washington after the holidays, talk turned to whether we should seek congressional approval for a use of force against Iraq. I opposed the idea. We had all the authority we needed, because the United States Senate had previously ratified the United Nations Charter, including Article 51, which allowed us to go to the assistance of a member state, such as Kuwait, that had been invaded. Moreover, if we got turned down by the Congress, that would be a huge blow to our coalition and to our troops already deployed. If the military action was successful, it wouldn’t matter whether Congress had supported us beforehand. If, on the other hand, we failed, even if we had a vote supporting the use of force we’d be faced with intense criticism, including from those who had voted with us. In other words, I thought there was significant risk in seeking their approval and very little to be gained.
I also thought it would set a dangerous precedent. As a legal and constitutional matter, the president had the authority he needed. If he sought congressional approval, that would surely be read by some as a message that he needed the congressional vote. It looked to me like a move that would diminish the power of the office. The president heard these arguments, but decided to go for a vote, and on January 8 he sent a letter to Congress seeking their approval for the use of “all necessary means to implement UN Security Council Resolution 678,” which required that Saddam withdraw from Kuwait.
Meanwhile, in an effort to ensure that we had exhausted all possibilities for a peaceful resolution, the president sent Jim Baker to Geneva to meet with Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz. I had been concerned that Jim might broker a last-minute deal based on Saddam’s promising to withdraw from Kuwait. What if Saddam used such a pledge to push us beyond the UN deadline? What if he pulled back into Iraq? Would we bring half a million troops home and wait for him to go over the border again? But when Baker called the president on the morning of January 9, it was to say that the Iraqis were determined to stay in Kuwait. The president, Brent, and I gathered around a small television set in the president’s private office as Baker was about to address the press corps gathered in the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva. As soon as he stepped in front of the cameras it was clear to the world from the look on his face that no deal had been struck. “Regrettably, ladies and gentlemen,...in over six hours I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the United Nations Security Council resolutions.”
Baker left Geneva to confer with our allies in Riyadh, and I went to work, lobbying hard for Congress to authorize the use of