In My Time - Dick Cheney [179]
We knew Congress had been focused on what could be done to stimulate the economy in the wake of the attacks, and Alan told me the Senate Finance Committee had asked for a closed-door hearing with him and former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. Alan was concerned that Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill hadn’t been included. He asked me to call the ranking Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, Chuck Grassley, on O’Neill’s behalf, which I did.
Finally, Alan said it would be important for him to have advance warning, if possible, of any military action. I thought back to Desert Storm. There was only one person I’d briefed outside the national security team in the days before we commenced operations, and that was Greenspan. He had come to my office in the Pentagon, and I had told him about the timing and the nature of what we planned. Based on our years of friendship and work together, I had confidence that Alan would maintain the secrecy of our operation, and I believed that it was important that the chairman of the Federal Reserve, responsible for the health of the nation’s financial institutions, not be surprised. I operated on the same basis now as we prepared to launch military operations in the aftermath of 9/11.
IN A SPEECH TO the nation on the afternoon of October 7, 2001, the president announced the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. “The United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,” he said. CIA covert operations teams had already been dispatched to work with the Northern Alliance and other opposition forces. Special operations forces would soon be entering the country.
At an NSC meeting on October 9, George Tenet raised a concern about the Northern Alliance taking Kabul. The Pashtuns who controlled southern Afghanistan would not react well to being governed by tribes from the north, he said, and the result could be civil war. I thought that any argument for holding back the Northern Alliance was misguided. Our objective was to take out al Qaeda, take down the Taliban, and prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for further operations. The way I saw it, we needed to get these things accomplished fast, before another attack on the homeland. And there was also the weather. After George finished his presentation, I spoke up. As soon as winter hits, I noted, the Northern Alliance is going to be socked in. We need to unleash them soon or accept that we’ll have to wait until spring.
In my estimation, we needed to be encouraging the Northern Alliance to advance. “Are there Taliban targets we can hit that would make it easier for them to move?” I asked. Frankly, I thought Kabul couldn’t fall soon enough, whether at the hands of the Northern Alliance or otherwise. It would be a visible sign of a new day in Afghanistan.
We were also very focused on getting Osama bin Laden. None of us believed that capturing or killing him would end the terrorist threat,