In My Time - Dick Cheney [183]
As we had begun the planning for our military operations in Afghanistan, many worried that we were taking on too formidable a task. As the Soviets could testify, Afghanistan was known as the graveyard of empires for good reason. Any power that would prevail there had to take into account not only the rugged, inhospitable terrain, but the fact that the Afghans were among the toughest, most ruthless fighters in the world. When we launched our efforts, however, it was with forces far superior to those the Soviets had deployed in the 1980s, and we enjoyed a tremendous technological advantage. We also had on our side the kind of creative thinking that freedom encourages. Using the CIA and our special operations forces to marry our technology with Afghan fighters brought about the Taliban’s downfall in a remarkably short time. And perhaps the most important distinction was that we were there to liberate, not to occupy; to free, not to oppress the Afghan people.
But, of course, that wasn’t the end of it, and as we find ourselves ten years later with nearly one hundred thousand American troops still fighting in Afghanistan, it’s important to recognize that in the war in which we are currently engaged, sure and swift victories are likely to be rare. To the extent that Desert Storm led us to expect quick triumphs, it taught us the wrong lesson.
Now we are taking on an enemy scattered throughout many parts of the world and committed to launching mass casualty attacks from any base it can find. The key test in this war is not how long it takes us to complete any particular military operation. The crucial test is whether our policies, including our military operations, are effective at defending the nation from further attack. Critical to that effort is recognizing that our ultimate objective must be ensuring that the Afghan security forces are sufficiently trained and equipped to defend their own people and territory. Our mission will not be complete until the Afghan government and armed forces can, on their own, prevent their nation from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.
In my view, the most important lesson to be learned from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s is what happened after the Soviets left. The United States turned its attentions elsewhere, and Afghanistan descended into civil war. The resultant instability and eventual takeover of the country by the Taliban meant that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorists were able to find a safe haven there. Throughout the late 1990s, thousands of terrorists were trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, and it became the base for the attacks of 9/11. When I hear policymakers talk about walking away from Afghanistan, I want to remind them of what the consequences can be.
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ONE OF THE FIRST efforts we undertook after 9/11 to strengthen the country’s defenses was securing passage of the Patriot Act, which the president signed into law on October 2001. The law, passed by overwhelming, bipartisan majorities in Congress, enabled law enforcement, intelligence officers, and national security personnel to share information about potential terrorist threats. It tore down the wall that had previously prevented this kind of cooperation. It also allowed law enforcement officers to apply tools long used to investigate organized crime to the fight against terrorists.
I also thought it important to be sure the National Security Agency, or NSA, which is responsible for collecting intelligence about the communications of America’s adversaries, was doing everything possible to track the conversations of terrorists, so I asked George Tenet whether the NSA had all the authorities it needed. Tenet said he would check with General Mike Hayden, who was then director, and a short time later both of them came to see me in my office in the White House. Hayden explained that he had already made adjustments in the way NSA was collecting intelligence. Those adjustments were possible