In My Time - Dick Cheney [206]
Inspectors subsequently discovered that Saddam had deceived them “about the extent of his program to mass produce VX, one of the deadliest chemicals known to man,” I said. And he had not shut down his prohibited missile programs, but had “continued to test such missiles, almost literally under the noses of UN inspectors.”
Given this record, a return of inspectors to Iraq did not ensure Saddam’s compliance with UN resolutions, but it would give him time to plot and plan and eventually acquire “the whole range of weapons of mass destruction.” I emphasized the need, in facing such a threat, to proceed with “care, deliberation, and consultation with our allies.” And we should keep in mind, I said, that for all the dangers we were facing, there were also opportunities:
With our help, a liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and has unlimited potential for a peaceful, prosperous future. Our goal would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every ethnic group are recognized and protected.
All who sought justice and dignity in Iraq, I concluded, “can know they have a friend and ally in the United States of America.”
WHEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY Council met at Camp David on Saturday, September 7, 2002, one of the topics on which we spent a good deal of time was the president’s upcoming speech at the United Nations. He was going there, as presidents often do, for the opening of the General Assembly. I was a strong advocate of using the speech to challenge the United Nations. The president should point out that the Security Council had passed sixteen resolutions aimed at removing the danger posed by Saddam. When he repeatedly violated them, the UN had responded with yet more resolutions. I argued that the time had come to confront the United Nations, hold the organization accountable, and make clear that if the Security Council was unwilling to impose consequences for violations, the UN would become irrelevant. What I hoped we wouldn’t do was what we’d done for the last twelve years—simply adopt yet one more meaningless resolution.
Underlying the debate over the speech and UN resolutions was the issue of military force itself. The president had not yet made a decision, but in neither this meeting nor any other I attended did any of the president’s advisors argue against using military force to remove Saddam from power. Nor did anyone argue that leaving Saddam in power, with all the risks and costs associated with that course, was a viable option.
When we finished our NSC meeting, the president hosted Tony Blair in his office in Laurel Lodge. I joined the two of them, and we talked through the need for United Nations involvement. Blair was tough. He understood the stakes and the importance of acting against Saddam, and he was clear that he would be with us no matter what—and that was likely to include strong opposition from within his own party.
Blair argued that a UN resolution was necessary to achieve maximum international cooperation. He was very persuasive, and I understood that the president wanted to support his friend. There was no legal obligation for us to pursue a resolution, but there were some in the United States and many more in Europe who felt it would legitimize military action, and a resolution would also speak to their concerns. The president told the prime minister he would go forward with a resolution.
I knew the president was no more interested than I was in an endless round of inspections and deception in Iraq, and in the days that followed, I recommended inserting into the resolution a requirement for Saddam to submit within thirty days a declaration disclosing his WMD capacity and holdings. This would lay down a marker, set a deadline for assessing one final time whether action against Saddam was required.
AS WORK WENT FORWARD at the United Nations, we also sought congressional