In My Time - Dick Cheney [221]
Pakistan was on edge. There were major problems in U.S.-Pakistani relations. President Pervez Musharraf’s hold on power was tenuous and he had al Qaeda sympathizers in key slots in his government. Pakistan’s radical Islamic movement was strong and areas of the country were hosting al Qaeda operating bases. Pakistan’s stability was a major concern. If radicals managed to take control, they would also control the country’s nuclear arsenal.
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein remained in power. He’d started two wars and produced and used WMD against the Kurds and the Iranians. He was providing safe haven and financial support to terrorists and twenty-five-thousand-dollar payments to encourage suicide bombers in Israel. His was one of the bloodiest regimes of the twentieth century and a dangerous potential link between terrorists and WMD capability.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, was in 2001 selling nuclear weapons technology and equipment to rogue states like Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi was Khan’s biggest customer.
And throughout the 1980s and 1990s, terrorists had learned two dangerous lessons from America’s weak response to previous attacks—on our embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, in Somalia, on the World Trade Center in 1993, on the military training facilities in Riyadh and at the Khobar Towers housing complex, on our embassies in East Africa, and on the U.S.S. Cole. First, terrorists came to believe they could strike with impunity, that the U.S. response was likely to be inconsequential. Second, they learned that if they did attack U.S. assets or personnel, we might well change our policy or withdraw.
By 2004 the world looked very different. The attacks of 9/11 had changed everything. We had strengthened our homeland defense, including improvements to our defenses against biological weapons, and created the Department of Homeland Security. We had also gone after the terrorists’ financial networks, improved our intelligence capabilities, and gone on the offense, implementing the Bush Doctrine.
We had driven the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, killing or capturing hundreds of al Qaeda fighters. Osama bin Laden and his deputies were on the run, hampering al Qaeda’s ability to plan attacks against the United States. A new government had been established in Afghanistan, a constitution had been written, and presidential elections would be held in the fall of 2004. Violence levels were down, the military was making progress, Afghan security forces were growing, and we were working closely with Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government. Afghanistan seemed on a positive trajectory.
In Pakistan President Musharraf had signed up with the United States after 9/11 and was providing significant support for our operations in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis had helped us capture or kill hundreds of al Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan, including the mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
In Iraq Saddam Hussein was no longer in power. His sons were dead. He was in jail. We had established an interim government, transferred sovereignty, and begun training Iraqi security forces so they could take on increasing responsibility. Though much hard work remained, the world was clearly safer with Saddam gone.
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi watched the U.S. action in Afghanistan and preparations for Iraq and decided he didn’t want to be next. As we launched into Iraq, we received a message that Qaddafi might be willing to give up his nuclear program. Senior U.S. intelligence officials worked with British counterparts to conduct nine months of negotiations with the Libyans. Then, six days after Saddam was captured, Qaddafi announced he would turn over all his WMD materials. His centrifuges, uranium hexafluoride,